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"NO SOUL TO DAMN: NO BODY TO KICK":
AN UNSCANDALIZED INQUIRY INTO
THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE
PUNISHMENTt
John C. Coffee, Jr. *
.Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no
soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked? 1
Edward, First Baron Thurlow 1731-1806

The Lord Chancellor of England quoted above was neither the
first nor the last judge to experience frustration when faced with a
convicted corporation.2 American sentencing judges are likely to
face a similar dilemma with increasing frequency in the near future,
for a number of signs indicate that corporate prosecutions will become increasingly commonplace. 3 At first glance, the problem of
corporate punishment seems perversely insoluble: moderate fines do
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* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; 1980-1981, Visiting Professor of
Law, Columbia University School of Law. B.A. 1966, Amherst College; LL.B. 1969, Yale
University; LL.M. 1976, New York University- Ed. This Article draws in part on the 1980
Governor James R. Thompson Lecture I delivered at the Northern Illinois University College
of Law.
l. Quoted in M. KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION l (1977). One version,
probably apocryphal, reports that the Lord Chancellor then added in a stage whisper, "(a]nd,
by God, it ought to have both." H.L. MENCKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON
HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES 223 (1942).
2. Long before Baron Thurlow's time, ecclesiastical courts had responded to corporate
misbehavior by imposing the decree of excommunication. This probably represents the first
occasion on which the anthropomorphic fallacy that the corporation was but an individual
misled courts. It was not the last. In the thirteenth century Pope Innocent IV forebade the
practice of excommunicating corporations on the unassailable logic that, since the corporation
had no soul, it could not lose one. He thus became the first legal realist in this area.
3. Between 1976 and 1979, 574 corporations were convicted in the federal courts. See
Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship, 11 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 501, 501 n.4 (1980). A comprehensive review by the editors of Fortune magazine has found that l l % of the 1,043 major corporations it surveyed were involved in a "major
delinquency" between 1970 and 1980 (a term it defined to include five crimes - bribery,
criminal fraud, illegal political contributions, and price-fixing or bid-rigging antitrust violations - regardless of whether the enforcement proceeding was brought in the form of a criminal or a civil action). See Ross, How Lawless Are Big Companies?, FORTUNE, Dec. I, 1980, at
56, 57. The extraordinary media attention given to the unsuccessful prosecution of the Ford
Motor Company for manslaughter for allegedly failing to correct known defects in the design
of its Pinto model may hasten this trend toward greater use of the criminal sanction. State v.
Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Ind. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 13, 1978). Other straws are also blowing
in the wind. See Courie, Justice Maps Out Criminal Approach For Health, Sofety, Legal Times
of Wash., Feb. ll, 1980, at l, col. l.
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not deter, while severe penalties fl.ow through the corporate shell and
fall on the relatively blameless.4 Nonetheless, this Article will submit that there are ways both to focus the incidence of corporate penalties on those most able to prevent repetition and to increase the
efficiency of corporate punishment without employing in terrorem
penalties.
This assertion may be greeted with polite indifference since an
obvious and simpler alternative to pursuing new forms of corporate
penalties is simply to prosecute the individual executive and ignore
the corporate entity. The case for such an individual focus to corporate law enforcement is strong, 5 but it is not unqualified. This Article will argue that law enforcement officials cannot afford to ignore
either the individual or the firm in choosing their targets, but can
realize important economies of scale by simultaneously pursuing
both. 6
Because this Article's arguments are interwoven, a preliminary
roadmap seems advisable. First, Section I will examine three perspectives on corporate punishment and will develop several concepts
in terms of which corporate penalties should be evaluated. Although
this analysis will suggest several barriers to effective corporate deterrence, Section II will explain why a sensible approach to corporate
misbehavior still must punish the firm as well as the individual decision-maker. Section III will then evaluate three proposed ap4. This Article will refer to the tendency for fines imposed on the corporation to fall on
others who are not culpable as the "overspill problem." It has, of course, been noted before.
See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.07, co=ent at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (noting that use of
punitive fines amounts to imposition of ''vicarious criminal liability" on "a group ordinarily
innocent of criminal conduct" -i.e., the stockholders). This same concern that punitive penalties would fall on innocent parties has surfaced in civil actions. See Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 {2d Cir. 1967) (punitive damages not imposed because they
would penalize innocent parties). Obviously, this "overspill" problem is not unique to the
criminal law context and arises any time severe penalties appear necessary to achieve deterrent
aims. Thus, the remedies here suggested are equally applicable in civil cases where the
problems discussed in this Article inhibit adequate deterrence.
5. The author has summarized these arguments elsewhere. See Coffee, Corporate Crime
and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 419 (1980).
6. These economies of scale derive not only from the obvious fact that both the corporation
and the individual defendants can be prosecuted on the basis of the same evidence and often at
the same trial, but also from the dynamics of plea bargaining under which all defendants have
an incentive to implicate each other in return for a sentencing concession. See, e.g., Dorfman,
Justice Thwarted· 17,e $2.4 Million Tipster, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, ·Feb. 13, 1979, at 13 (detailing settlement agreement under which former general counsel of Gulf and Western Inc.
pleaded guilty and received probation in return for cooperation and testimony against his
corporation); Pound, Ex-Frito-Lay Official Pleads Guilty in Plot to Corner Peanut Oil Market,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1980, at 19, col. 1 (similar facts); Kiernan, Macl)onnell Plea Bargain Fell
Through, Wash. Post, June 10, 1980, at D6, col. 4 (tentative agreement for corporation to plead
guilty in return for dismissal of charges against individuals rejected by corporation's founder).
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proaches: (1) the "equity fine,'' (2) the use of adverse publicity, and
(3) the fuller integration of public and private enforcement.7 In addition, it will consider whether anything is gained by prosecuting the
corporation in a criminal, as opposed to civil, proceeding. Finally,
Section IV will look beyond remedies designed to increase deterrence to the possibility of incapacitative sanctions. This latter inquiry is promoted by recent judicial decisions and legislative
proposals that permit courts to place corporations on probation. 8 Interesting questions are thus presented: Can an organization be rehabilitated? If so, what goals should the sentencing court pursue and
what remedies can it realistically implement?
This essay is written as Professor Alfred Conard nears retirement
from a long and distinguished career. The thesis advanced herein is
not necessarily one Professor Conard would agree witµ, but its attempt to establish connections between the distant fields of corporate
and criminal law follows the tradition of an inter-disciplinary approach to problems of corporate behavior which he has long trailblazed. Like W. Somerset Maugham's character who could keep his
attention on both the moon and the sixpence, Professor Conard has
shown the ability to move from theory to practice. This essay will
attempt to do likewise, moving first from a theoretical overview to a
consideration of practical remedies which the sentencing court might
employ.

1.

PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE PENALTIES: WHY
SANCTIONS FALL SHORT

The literature on corporate sanctions sometimes seems to consist
of little more than the repeated observation that the fines imposed on
convicted corporations have historically been insignificant.9 True as
this point undoubtedly is, it is also a short-sighted critique. It ignores both the judiciary's reasons for declining to impose more severe penalties and the possibility that a monetary penalty sufficiently
high to deter the corporation may be infeasible or undesirable. Once
7. These approaches could be at least partially implemented by the judiciary under its
current powers, without new legislative authorization. See notes 197-200 iefra and accompanying text.
8. These cases, discussed at note 173 iefra, are analyzed in Note, Structural Crime and
Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 368
n.92 (1979).
9. ·See, e.g., Geis, .Deterring Corporate Crime, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 182-97
(R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); Geis, Criminal Penaltiesfar Corporate Criminals, 8 CRIM, L.
BULL. 377, 381 (1972); Note, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE LJ. 280, 285 n.17 (1961).
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these possibilities are considered, the problem of corporate criminal
behavior becomes radically more complex. Three independent, but
overlapping perspectives each suggest that monetary penalties directed at the corporation will often prove inadequate to deter illegal
behavior. In order, this Article will survey the field from the perspectives of the neo-classical economist, the organization theorist,
and the public policy specialist who is concerned that the costs of
punishment may exceed the benefits of deterrence.
A.

The .Deterrence Trap

Our first perspective flows directly from the application of the
econo~c theory of deterrence to an empirical premise. Economists
generally agree that an actor who contemplates committing a crime
will be deterred only if the "expected punishment cost" of a proscribed action exceeds the expected gain. 10 This concept of the expected punishment cost involves more than simply the amount of the
penalty. Rather, the expected penalty must be discounted by the
likelihood of apprehension and conviction in order to yield the expected punishment cost. For example, if the expected gain were $1
million and the risk of apprehension were 25%, the penalty would
have to be raised to $4 million in order to make the expected punishment cost equal the expected gain. 11 One may well question the adequacy of this simple formula when applied to individual defendants,
because the stigmatization of a criminal conviction constitutes an additional and severe penalty for the white-collar defendant. 12 But this
loss of social status is a less significant consideration for the corpo10. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 16 J. POL. EcoN. 169
(1968). For a shorter exposition of this view, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
165-67 (2d ed. 1977).
11. See R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 167. Here $4 million times 25% exactly equals, and
cancels out, the $ I million expected gain.
Some recent commentators have sought to apply this formula to corporations through a
penalty system in which the fine is set equal to the expected gain times a "non-detection factor/multiplier." See Note, .Deterring Air Polluters Through Economically Efficient Sanctions: A
Proposalfar Amending the Clean Air Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 807, 818-19 (1980). Such a proposal makes sense where the risk of detection can be measured and is found to be relatively high
(as was apparently the case, id. at 815), but this Article will argue that our ability to so escalate
cash penalties is limited, both because it is bounded by the corporation's available financial
resources, and because such penalties impose externalities on the public and thus face judicial
nullification.
12. Some research suggests that stigmatization is the chief deterrent for middle-class offenders. See Nagin & Blumstein, The Deterrent Effect ofLegal Sanctions on Droft Evasion, 29
STAN. L. REV. 241 (1977). Although the article deals specifically with draft evaders, the authors speculate that their findings may have generalized relevance to most forms of whitecollar crime. See note 107 infra and accompanying text.
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rate entity, and we are thus forced to rely largely on monetary sanctions.
The crux of the dilemma arises from the fact that the maximum
meaningful fine that can be levied against any corporate offender is
necessarily bounded by its wealth. 13 Logically, a small corporation
is no more threatened by a $5 million fine than by a $500,000 fine if
both are beyond its ability to pay. In the case of an individual offender, this wealth ceiling on the deterrent threat of fines causes J;l.O
serious problem because we can still deter by threat of incarceration.
But for the corporation, which has no body to incarcerate, this
wealth boundary seems an absolute limit on the reach of deterrent
threats directed at it. If the "expected punishment cost" necessary to
deter a crime crosses this threshold, adequate deterrence cannot be
achieved. For example, if a corporation having $10 million of
wealth were faced with an opportunity to gain $1 million through
some criminal act or omission, such conduct could not logically be
deterred by monetary penalties directed at the corporation if the risk
of apprehension were below 10%. That is, if the likelihood of apprehension were 8%, the necessary penalty would have to be $12.5 million (ie., $1 million times 12.5, the reciprocal of 8%). Yet such a fine
exceeds the corporation's ability to pay. In short, our ability to deter
the corporation may be confounded by our inability to set an adequate punishment cost which does not exceed the corporation's resources.14
The importance of this barrier (which this Article will call the
"deterrence trap") 15 depends on whether rates of apprehension for
corporate crimes are typically low. Although there are exceptions,
most corporate crimes seem highly concealable. This is so because,
unlike victims of classically under-reported crimes (such as rape or
child abuse), victims of many corporate crimes do not necessarily
know of their injury. The victim of price-fixing may never learn that
he has overpaid; the consumer of an unsafe, toxic, or carcinogenic
13. See Block & Lind, Crime and Punishment Reconsidered, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 242-43
(1975).
For an increasing number of corporations, the wealth boundary may be reached at a surprisingly low level. See Emshwiller, Plunging Power: Big Financial Problems Hit Electrical
Utilities; Bankruptcies Feared, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
14. To be sure, the corporation's resources include more than its immediately available
liquid assets, since the corporation can borrow and the fine can be deferred through installment payments. But, it seems a safe premise that financial institutions will be reluctant to lend
substantial amounts to finance the payment of a penalty by a recently convicted corporation,
particularly where civil damage actions may follow quickly on the heels of the conviction and
where the initial conviction may trigger further investigations and disclosures of misbehavior.
15. The term "deterrence trap" is used because this problem has many of the same characteristics as the "liquidity trap," a problem familiar to students of macroeconomic analysis.
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product typically remains unaware of the hazards to which he has
been exposed. Even the government or a fellow competitor may
rarely discover the tax fraud or illegal bribe which has cost it a substantial loss in revenues.
The ability to conceal corporate crime has been little noticed by
economists, in all likelihood because they have often been preoccupied with the antitrust context. Yet the characteristics of horizontal
price-fixing (the classic antitrust violation) make it more subject to
eventual exposure than the safety and environmental violations that
now especially concern society. At bottom, a price-fixing conspiracy
among competitors is a very unstable enterprise because it must extend beyond the individual firm. If one may generalize based on the
detected price-fixing conspiracies of recent years, they tend to have
involved dozens of corporate participants within an industry, 16 and
thus many employees are likely to know about the illegal activity,
thereby multiplying the likelihood of exposure. More importantly,
when a new competitor enters the affected market because of the
excessively high prices, the existing conspiracy must either offer the
entrant membership in the cartel, or engage in some form of strategic
price-cutting to drive it out.17 Add to this picture, in industries that
employ sealed competitive bidding, the tendency for price-fixing
conspiracies to produce conspicuously parallel price movements and
the odds of eventual exposure rise exponentially in comparison to an
illegal activity wholly contained within a single firm. Admittedly,
other forms of crime may produce lasting evidence as well; for example, an environmental violation may leave scars lasting for decades.
But illegal toxic dumps and industrial rivers tell few tales by which
to connect the evidence to a particular actor.
Beyond ease of concealment, legal and behavioral characteristics
distinguish price-fixing from other corporate crimes: safety and environmental violations involve questions of judgment which the participants can rationalize without consciously (or at least explicitly)
16. Many recent price-fixing conspiracies have involved numerous participants. At least
36 forest products companies were alleged in 1978 to have fixed the price of corrugated containers over a period of years; similarly, 24 companies were allegedly involved in a price-fixing
conspiracy in the folding cartons market. These cases have resulted in total settlements paid to
date by the defendants of over $500 million. See Rudnitsky & Blyskal, Gelling into those deep
pockets, FORBES, Aug. 4, 1980, at 59-62. Twenty-nine corporations and 45 individual defendants were indicted in the electrical equipment antitrust cases in 1961. See Geis, The Heavy
Electrical Equipment Cases of 1961, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 119 (rev. ed. 1977).
17. Because of this problem some economists have long argued that cartels are inherently
unstable. See Dewey, The Economic Theory ofAntitrust: Science or Religion?, 50 VA. L. REV.
413, 428 (1964) (case studies of cartels have not found them to be "very powerful organizations"). See generally Dewey, Mergers and Cartels: Some Reservations About Policy, 13 AM.
ECON. A. PAPERS & PROC. 255 (1960).
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engaging in behavior they know to be illegal. In addition, many, if
not most, forms of corporate crime require some element of intent
(ie., "knowingly" or "willfully") which can be exceedingly difficult
to prove in the context of prosecuting a white-collar worker for a
"regulatory" offense. Although intent is also a prerequisite for a
criminal antitrust violation, 18 a price-fixing conspiracy, if detected,
speaks for itself. 19 These legal and behavioral differences between
antitrust and other violations may affect the expected punishment
cost necessary to deter corporate crime. If the individual does not
realize he is committing a crime, his perceived risk of apprehension
will be very low. Similarly, if intent is difficult to prove in prosecutions for regulatory offenses, the risk of conviction - if not of apprehension - will be lower than in the price-fixing cases. Accordingly,
the penalty necessary to deter such illegal activity would rise. Thus,
the classic price-fixing conspiracy may not be a representative example of organizational crime.
The final element in the deterrence equation requires little emphasis: corporate misbehavior involves high stakes. A $50,000 bribe
may secure a $50 million defense contract, a failure to report a safety
or design defect in a product may avert a multi-million dollar recall,
and the suppression of evidence showing a newly discovered adverse
side effect of a popular drug may save its manufacturer an entire
product market. 20 Thus, when all the elements of the equation are
combined, it is not unrealistic to predict that cases will arise in which
the expected gain may be $10 million or higher, while the likelihood
of apprehension is under 10%. If so, a mechanical application of the
economist's deterrence formula suggests that only penalties of $100
million or above could raise the "expected publishment cost" to a
level in excess of the expected gain. Few corporations, if any, could
pay such a fine and any attempt to levy it in installments would require the court to charge very high interest in order to compensate
18. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
19. For example, any evidence of inter-firm price discussions, or the revelation to competitors of intended future bids, will virtually establish a prima facie case for the government. The
covert manner in which price-fixing conspiracies are typically hidden from senior corporate
officials shows that the participants recognize their potential vulnerability if any disclosure
occurs.
20. For the classic case of Richardson-Merrell's suppression of adverse findings with respect to the drug MER/29, see C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 54-56 (1975). Stone estimates that a mere two-year delay in the withdrawal of the drug grossed its manufacturer an
additional $7 million. Id q: Armstrong, Social Irresponsibility in Management, 5 J, Bus.
RESEARCH 185 (1977) (describing a role-playing experiment which indicates that managers
tend to make socially irresponsible decisions in order to further shareholder interests).
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for the time value of money (which implies that a deferred fine is a
substantially reduced fine).

B. The Behavioral Perspective
An abstract quality surrounds the foregoing economic analysis.
Lucid as its logic seems, it ignores the organizational dynamics
within the firm and treats the corporation. as a "black box" which
responds in a wholly amoral fashion to any net difference between
expected costs and benefits.21 Students of organizational decisionmaking have always rejected this "black box" model of the firm and
have been quick to point out that a fundamental incongruence may
exist between the aims of the manager and those of the firm. 22 Indeed, this assertion is but a corollary of the famous Berle-Means thesis that control and ownership have been divorced in the modern
public corporation. 23 Given this separation, it follows that the "real
world" corporation manager may view corporate participation in
criminal activities from the standpoint of how to maximize his own
ends, rather than those of the firm.
Does the behavioral perspective indicate that corporate misbehavior may be easier to deter than the foregoing economic analysis
suggests? Regrettably, the reverse may be the case: for several reasons, the behavioral perspective suggests that it may be extraordinarily difficult to prevent corporate misconduct by punishing only the
firm. First, from such a perspective, it seems clear that the individual manager may perceive illegal conduct to be in his interest, even if
the potential costs to which it exposes the firm far exceed the potential corporate benefits. For example, the executive vice president
who is a candidate for promotion to president may be willing to run
risks which are counterproductive to the firm as a whole because he
-is eager to make a record profit for his division or to hide a prior
error of judgment. Correspondingly, the lower echelon executive
with a lackluster record may deem it desirable to resort to illegal
means to increase profits (or forestall losses) in order to prevent his
dismissal or demotion. 24 Others in between these two extremes may
21. For a well-known critique of the neo-classical model's "black box" approach to corporate behavior, see C. STONE, supra note 20, at 35-37.
22. Id. at 46-50.
23. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev.
ed. 1967). For a much-praised reinterpretation of this thesis, see M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976).
24. For a series of recent examples, see Getschow, Overdriven Executives: Some Middle
Managers Cut Corners to Achieve High Corporate Goals, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
Studying a series of cases in which middle-level managers sent falsified data to their corporate
headquarters, Getschow finds a common pattern in which "an employee often confronts a
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have an interest in incentive compensation or other personal objectives which cause their interests to deviate from those of their firm.
Necessarily, the manager acts within a shorter time frame than the
firm (if only because in the long run, the manager, unlike his firm,
will be dead), and thus may focus more on short-run profit maximization.
Neo-classical economists have always objected to this argument.
They have framed a theoretical rebuttal: if properly motivated, the
corporation could implement controls adequate to detect and penalize such free-lance activity by its agents. 25 In theory, the firm has the
power to reduce the incongruence between the aims of the manager
and the firm by using internal sanctions to compel the manager to
adopt the firm's ends as his own.26 In practice, it is debatable
whether such a system could be installed since some forms of misconduct may be easily concealed even from the firm. The deterrence
.trap discussed above also poses a barrier, since if the firm cannot be
adequately penalized, it will not vigorously monitor its agents.
In light of this possible rejoinder, it is important to move from
theoretical to empirical arguments. The theoreticians of deterrence
tend to assume that the actor has perfect knowledge, or at least can
calculate with reasonable accuracy the odds of apprehension. In reality, we lack even an approximate estimate of how much white-collar crime occurs or how often it results in conviction. 27 Because an
accurate calculation of the cost/benefit calculus which the
microeconomic approach utilizes is thus improbable, the critical variable becomes the actor's attitude toward risk. Is he a risk averter or
a risk preferrer? Other things being equal, the risk-averse manager
tends to be deterred by high penalties even when they are associated
with low rates of apprehension, while a risk-preferring manager
would look at the same combination of penalties and probabilities
and not be deterred. 28 Knowing only that apprehension is a longhard choice - to risk being branded incompetent by telling superiors that they ask too much,
or to begin taking unethical or illegal shortcuts." Other recent cases are mentioned in Editorial, Why Managers Cheat, Bus. Week, March 17, 1980, at 196 (discussing other recent cases),
See note 37 infra.
25. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 235-36; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 225-26
(1976).
26. I have surveyed the practical objections to this theoretical argument elsewhere. See
Coffee, supra note 5, at 456-65.
27. This information is necessary to determine the risk of apprehension; yet, it seems unobtainable given both the likelihood that the victim will be unaware of his injury and the uncertain scope of the "white-collar crime." q: Coffee, supra note 5, at 442 (both definition and
accurate census of white-collar crime impossible, though crucial to any economic analysis of
the problem).
28. For a cogent exposition, see K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 120-
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shot, the risk preferrer will be likely to chance profitable illegal behavior, even though an apprehension would devastate his career.
Although some theorists have argued that the typical corporate
manager is risk averse, 29 some empirical evidence points in the opposite direction. Repeated studies have detected a phenomenon
known as the "risky shift": businessmen participating in role-playing experiments have shown a pronounced tendency to make "riskier" decisions when acting in a small group than when acting
alone. 30 That is, the degree of risk they are willing to accept increases dramatically when the decision is reached collectively within
a small group - exactly the context in which most business decisions
are made. Other experiments have found such small groups of businessmen willing to ignore extremely strong evidence of social irresponsibility and legal obstacles when making business decisions
involving the introduction of dangerous or unsafe products. 31 These
experiments can be read in several ways. They may indicate that
businessmen are more risk-preferring (at least, collectively) than the
average citizen, or they may imply that businessmen acting in small
groups become more optimistic and reduce their estimates of the
risks in a given situation from what they would perceive them to be
individually.32 Either way, the result is the same: so long as the
odds on apprehension are unknown, but probably low, many businessmen are likely to reach a subjective estimate of the legal risks in
a given situation which leads them to accept these risks - even if the
average citizen alone would not.
A related and reinforcing perspective on the psychology of the
representative business manager is suggested by another central
tenet of the organization theorist. While the economist assumes that
firms uniformly seek to maximize profits, organization theorists, such
29 (1976). See also Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 693, 704-06 (1973).
29. K. ELZINGA &

w. BREIT, supra note 28, at 126-28.

30. Reed, On the .Dynamics oJ Group .Decisionmaking in High Places, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Winter 1978, at 40-49; M. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL
GROUP BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1976); Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shf/ts in Group .Decisions, 4 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 442 (1968). See also M. MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN (1976). For
a critical review of this literature, see Cartwright, .Determinance oJScient!ftc Progress: The Case
oJResearch on the Risky Shf/1, 28 AM. PSYCH. 222, 225-29 (1973). See also note 32 infra.
31. Armstrong, Social Irresponsibility in Management, 5 J. Bus. RESEARCH 185, 194-210
(1977).
32. This interpretation has been suggested to me by Professor Richard Lempert of the
University of Michigan Law School, and it seems to me the most plausible explanation for a
frankly perplexing phenomenon. In short, what we may be witnessing is a shift not toward
risk, but toward optimism because groups feel themselves more able to overcome difficulties
than do individuals.
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as Nobel laureate Herbert Simon, have found the typical manager
more likely to engage in what they term "satisficing" behavior. 33
That is, instead of assembling all available information and choosing
the best alternative, individuals tend to accept the first alternative
presented to them that satisfies the minimum criteria. In short, individuals pursue not optimal solutions, but satisfactory ones; they seek
not answers that maximize, but ones that suffice. From this perspective, which assumes that individuals act not on perfect knowledge
but rather on random search strategies,34 it is possible to see why the
harried manager finds illegality attractive in many circumstances.
Overworked, overloaded and faced with a maze of sometimes conflicting governmental regulations, the simplest solution which permits him to function is often that of falsification.
Finally, the behavioral perspective highlights one of the most basic causes of misbehavior within organizations: individuals frequently act out ofloyalty to a small group within the firm with which
they identify.35 Thus, engineers working on the development of a
particular project may develop an intense dedication to it which
leads them to suppress negative safety findings. 36 Similarly, a plant
manager may falsify environmental data out of a fear that the prohibitive costs of bringing the plant into compliance might result in its
closirig. 37 This pattern is consistent with a considerable body of so33. The classic works in this area are J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958), and
R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963). On "profit satisficing,"
see J. MARCH & H. SIMON, supra, at 8-10.
34. Herbert Simon has argued that the firm does not have perfect knowledge, but must
search through various alternatives in sequential fashion. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra
note 33, at 10. This process is largely conditioned by the environment: that is, the most obvious or available alternatives will be considered first, and the search may be concluded when
the first answer is obtained which provides a satisfactory strategy capable of meeting the basic
criteria. See J. MARCH & H. SIMON, supra note 33, at I 13-17, 138-42, 169-71. Since this
sequential search model does not imply that further investment of time or effort will produce a
superior result, the individual is likely to abandon his inquiry with the first "satisfactory"
result. Id. at 140-41.
35. See C. ARGYRIS, INTEGRATING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE ORGANIZATION (1964). See
also R. LIKERT, THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION 49-51, 158-88 (1967). For a related exposition,
see Likert, A Motivational Approach to a Modffeed Theory of Organization and Management, in
MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY 184 (M. H~ire ed. 1959).
36. See Stone, supra note 20, at 43-44. See also Getschow, supra note 24.
37. Professor Leonard Orland of the University of Connecticut Law School recently served
as a consultant to the Department of Justice in its prosecution of a large chemical corporation
for dumping substantial quantities of highly toxic mercury into the Niagara River. He informs
me that the immediate motivation for the violation appears to have been the plant manager's
fear that compliance with governmental regulations would have encouraged the corporation to
close down the already obsolete plant because the expense of new equipment could not be
justified. A similar fear seems to have caused a lower-level official of Allied Chemical to
falsify reports to the Army Corps of Engineers concerning the dumping of Kepone into Chesapeake Bay. See Zim, Allied Chemical's $20 Million Ordeal with Kepone, FOR.TUNE, Sept. 11,
1978, at 82, 84. This also seems to fit the larger pattern described by Getschow, supra note 24.
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cial science data which suggests that the individual's primary loyalty
within any organization is to his immediate work group. Within this
group, he will engage in candid disclosure and debate, but he will
predictably edit and screen data before submitting them to superiors
in order to cast his sub-unit in a favorable light. 38
From this perspective, the following generalization becomes understandable: the locus of corporate crime is predominantly at the
lower to middle management level.39 Although public interest
groups are vocal in their denunciations of "crime in the suites," in
truth the most shocking safety and environmental violations are almost exclusively the product of decisions at lower managerial levels.
Senior executives may still bear some causal responsibility, but the
chain of causation is remote, and their influence on decisions is only
indirect.
To understand this assessment, the multi-divisional and often
radically decentralized40 structure of the modemyublic corporation
must be examined. Increasingly, a central corporate headquarters
monitors operationally autonomous divisions, but its review is focused on budgetary matters and strategic planning. Operational
control typically remains in the division. Indeed, some economists
have compared the central corporate office to a miniature capital
market, since its primary function is to allocate funds to profitable
divisions and to discipline those which fail to meet targeted profitability goals. 41
The nature of this disciplinary monitoring by the central office is
of particular relevance. Because it is at considerable organizational
distance and its attention is focused on the income statement, the
central office can avoid responsibility for operational decisions while
at the same time holding the division responsible for a failure to
38. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward A 77zeoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, ll44 (1977); Likert, supra
note 35, at 190-202.
39. The recent Fortune survey of criminal activity within major corporations reached a
similar conclusion: "Except in cases hinging on illegal political contributions-once a way of
life in many corporations and rarely investigated or prosecuted prior to Watergate-the chief
executive is seldom personally implicated. Typically, even the executives running the guilty
subsidiary or division disavow any knowledge of the wrongdoing below." Ross, supra note 3,
at 64. See also Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, Why .Do Companies Succumb to Price-Fixing?, HARV.
Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1978, at 145 (stressing the tendency for collusive price-fixing to occur at
lower echelons, despite top management efforts to prevent such practices).
40. See Coffee, supra note 38, at 1132-46. For the classic historical overview of the transition to the multi-divisional firm, see A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE (1962).
41. See generally P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, REsPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 57291 (1973); P. DRUCKER, THE CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION (1946); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 133-37 (1975); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS
BEHAVIOR ll6-19 (1970).
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meet profit quotas assigned it. Through a variety of penalties and
incentives -ie., salary and fringe benefits, increased or diminished
staff and budget, and the threat of dismissal or demotion - the central office in the multi-divisional firm pressures the operating divisions to comply with its goals. Thus, the directive from the top of the
organization is to increase profits by fifteen percent, but the means
are left to the managerial discretion of the middle manager who is in
operational control of the division.
Properly applied, such pressure establishes and enforces accountability without sacrificing the flexibility and adaptiveness that are the
virtues of decentralization. However, this structure also permits the
central headquarters to insulate itself from responsibility for operational decisions while simultaneously pressuring for quick solutions
to often intractable problems.42 • The middle manager is acutely
aware that he can easily be replaced; he knows that if he cannot
achieve a quick fix, another manager is waiting in the wings, eager to
assume operational control over a division. The results of such a
structure are predictable: when pressure is intensified, illegal or irresponsible means become attractive to a desperate middle manager
who has no recourse against a stem but myopic notion of accountability that looks only to the bottom line of the income statement.
42. The intense pressure on middle management and the conflicting signals it receives
from senior levels to obey or ignore legal commands has led one recent writer to view middle
management as the new "oppressed class." See E. SHORRIS, THE OPPRESSED MIDDLE: PouTICS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT (1981). Similarly, in an editorial entitled "Why Managers
Cheat," .Business Week offered just such an explanation for illegal behavior within public
corporations:
The behavior is rooted in the short-run focus on profits that has hypnotized so many
corporate managements. This year's profits - and even more important, this quarter's determine the management's actions. . . .
In the diversified corporation run by financial people who have no feel for the fiber
and texture of a business, the bottom line is all that matters. They manage the bottom line
to produce a desired number of dollars in profit, and then they order division executives
to produce their share - or else. The door is opened for shenanigans that the top management doesn't expect and cannot curtail because it doesn't understand the business.
Middle management in a lot of companies is under excruciating pressure to meet
profit goals that are too tough.
Bus. WEEK, March 17, 1980, at 196.
.Business Week's observations are hardly novel. In the early 1960s, at the time of the electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy, some newspapers traced the underlying cause of that
episode to the "Cordiner Plan" (named after the then-president of General Electric) under
which decision-making decentralized at the division level. As the New York Times saw it,
''This [plan] gives managers of different branches complete authority to run independently of
central headquarters. They are required to show a profit or be dismissed." N.Y. Times, Feb.
28, 1961, at 26, col. l, quoted in Note, supra note 9, at 291 n.49. This variety of causal explanation, however, fails to note that virtually all multi-product large corporations are similarly
decentralized because of the functional impossibility of having one senior management run
frequently unrelated and disparate businesses. Thus, the search for a remedy must seek ways
to reduce the level of pressure on middle managers while recognizing that decentralization is
an inevitable pattern within large organizations.
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Paul Lawrence, a professor of organizational behavior at the
Harvard Business School, has summarized this dilemma:
A certain amount of tension is desirable. But at many companies the
pressures to perform are so intense and the goals so unreasonable that
some middle managers feel the only way out is to bend the rules, even
if it means compromising personal ethics. . . . When a manager feels
his job or division's survival is at stake, the corporation's standards of
business conduct are apt to be sacrificed.43

For the middle-level official the question is not whether the behavior is too risky to be in the interests of the corporation from a
cost/benefit standpoint. Rather, it is: which risk is greater - the
criminal conviction of the company or his own dismissal for failure
to meet targets set by an unsympathetically demanding senior management. Because the conviction of the corporation falls only indirectly on the middle manager, it can seldom exceed the penalty that
dismissal or demotion means to him. The middle manager thus
faces a very different set of potential costs and benefits from the corporate entity. For example, a given crime may carry with it a forty
percent risk of apprehension - presumably too high a level to be
very attractive to the corporation. But if compliance with the legal
standard subjects the middle manager to a fifty percent chance of
dismissal for failure to meet a corporate profit quota, crime may well
be attractive to him even if it is anathema to his corporate employer.
Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, this middle-level manager
will seek short-run survival through concealment, falsification and,
when necessary, illegality.
To sum up, in the modem public corporation it is not only ownership and control that are divorced (as Berle and Means recognized
long ago), but also strategic decision-making and operational control. In an era of finance capitalism, the manager responsible for
operational and production decisions is increasingly separated by organization, language, goals, and experience from the financial manager who today plans ap.d directs the corporation's future. 44 This
43. Getshow, supra note 24, at 1.
In a textbook illustration of this pattern, Ford Motor Company -engineers falsified auto
emissions data supplied to the Environmental Protection Agency by tinkering with the cars
undergoing federal certification tests. Id. at 34. This test rigging was discovered and eventually resulted in Ford paying seven million dollars in civil and criminal penalties. It seems
unrealistic to believe that senior Ford management would even tacitly have approved such
actions, if only because such tests could not be rigged for long without detection. G.M. has
had a similar experience with middle management misbehavior that resulted in substantial
financial loss to the corporation. As a result of a covert assembly line "speed-up" in violation
of its collective bargaining agreement, General Motors was forced to pay $1 million in backpay to affected workers and incurred lasting enmity with its labor force. Id.
44. q: Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic .Decline, HARV. Bus. REv.,
July-Aug. 1980, at 67 (criticizing new managerial philosophy of American business which
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tends both to insulate the upper echelon executive (who may well
desire that the sordid details of "meeting the competition" or "coping with the regulators" not filter up to his attention) and to intensify
the pressures on those below by denying them any forum in which to
explain the crises they face. This generalization helps to explain
both the infrequency with which corporate misconduct can be traced
to senior levels and the limited effort made to date within many firms
to develop a system of legal auditing which approaches the sophistication of financial auditing.
This portrait is to a degree deliberately overdrawn. Some corpo- ·
rations have developed procedures by which middle managers participate in the shaping of long-term profit goals for their division,
and relatively few corporations enforce the notion of accountability
so rigidly as to permit no excuse for failure to meet a profit goal. 45
Consider it, then, a portrait of the pathological organization. But to
the extent it even approximates the internal dynamics within some
firms, such corporations are essentially undeterrable (at least in the
short run) by penalties focused only on the firm. In the last analysis,
whether we take the economic perspective or the behavioral one, we
tend to reach this same conclusion.

C. The Externa!ity Problem
The idea of externalities as applied to the actions of public bodies
is probably best illustrated by the common practice of most highway
departments in liberally dumping salt on frozen roads. This technique cures their problem of ice-coated roads at a relatively low cost,
but it also imposes an "external cost" on landowners and drivers:
plants die along the borders of such roadways, and cars rust and
deteriorate more quickly because of the effect of the salt on their
exteriors. This cost, however, is not borne by the highway department, and thus is externalized in the same sense that a manufacturer
gives excessive attention to short-term financial performance). See also Ingrassia, Corporations: A Perilous L!fe at the Top, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1981, at 18, col. 3 (quoting business
historian Harold F. Williamson on the short-term focus of American management). See also
note 42 supra.
45. The Woll Street Journal has reported that "some companies, stung by the consequences of middle managers' wrongdoing, now . . . are trying to make sure that in motivating
people, they don't create an atmosphere conducive to unethical behavior." Getschow, supra
note 24, at 34. One company cited was Mead Corporation, which was forced in 1976 to plead
no contest to price-fixing charges. This shock apparently provoked reevaluation of its incentive system for motivating middle managers. But see E. SHORRIS, supra note 42, for the
counter view that middle management is unavoidably exposed to intense pressure and ambiguous co=ands from senior levels. See also text at notes 193-94 infra.
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traditionally never bore the cost of his pollution that fell on the adjoining landowners downwind.
In this same sense, punishment imposes both external and internal costs. For example, the direct public cost of imprisonment (e.g. ,
the cost of the prison system) is an internal cost which law enforcement authorities must recognize in jailing people. But the welfare
cost of sustaining the jailed person's family is likely to be externalized, falling on other agencies and receiving less attention.
The problem of external costs is present in the case of corporate
punishment, and comes into focus when we consider the incidence of
financial penalties imposed on the corporation. As a moment's reflection reveals, the costs of deterrence tend to spill over onto parties
who cannot be characterized as culpable. Axiomatically, corporations do not bear the ultimate cost of the fine; put simply, when the
corporation catches a cold, someone else sneezes. This overspill of
the penalty initially imposed on the corporation has at least four distinct levels, each progressively more serious. First, stockholders bear
the penalty in the reduced value of their securities. Second, bondholders and other creditors suffer a diminution in the value of their
securities which reflects the increased riskiness of the enterprise.
These points have been made many times both in the Model Penal
Code ,46 and in the writings of such respected scholars as Francis Allen,47 Sanford Kadish48 and Alan Dershowitz.49 The analysis, however, needs to be carried several steps further: the third level of
incidence of a severe financial penalty involves parties even less culpable than the stockholders. As a class, the stockholders can at least
sometimes be said to have received unjust enrichment from the benefits of the crime; this arguably justifies their indirectly bearing a
compensating fine. However, if the fine is severe enough to threaten
the solvency of the corporation, the predictable response will be a
cost-cutting campaign, involving reductions in the work force
through layoffs of lower echelon employees who received no benefit
from the earlier crime. so Severe financial penalties thus interfere
46. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.07, Co=ent (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
47. See F. Allen, Regulation by Indictment: The Criminal Law as an Instrument of Economic Control 13 (Sept. 28, 1978) (Mcinally Memorial Lecture at the University of Michigan
Graduate School of Business Administration).
48. See Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in E'!fardng Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423,433 (1963).
49. See Note, supra note 9 (student note by Dershowitz, then Editor-in-Chief, Yale Law
Journal).
50. I anticipate that some will rebut that the fine is a "sunk cost" which should not enter
into future firm decision-making, except insofar as it encourages avoidance of future costly
legal violations. To be sure, the corporation will probably not cut back on profitable opera-
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with public goals of full employment and minority recruitment by
restricting corporate expansion. In a society willing to bail out a
Chrysler to save the jobs of its workers, it would seem perversely
inconsistent to punish a Ford for its Pinto by imposing financial
sanctions that resulted in plant closings and layoffs. Finally, there is
the fourth level of incidence of a financial penalty: it may be passed
onto the consumer. If the corporation competes in a product market
characterized by imperfect competition (a trait of most of the "real
world"), then the fine may be recovered from consumers in the form
of higher prices. If this happens, the ''wicked" corporation not only
goes unpunished, but the intended beneficiary of the criminal statute
(i.e., the consumer) winds up bearing its penalty.
This tendency for corporate penalties to fall most heavily on the
least culpable is not the only extemality which law enforcement officials must consider. Nearly as important is the impact of large fines
on the innocent corporation. Put simply, the innocent corporation
can be forced to settle.51 This phenomenon can be seen from both
an economic and an empirical perspective. The cost/benefit approach of economists indicates that the rational choice for the innocent corporation charged with a violation depends very much on the
possible sanction. For example, if a private antitrust plaintiff commences a treble damage action seeking $30 million in damages and
the defendant corporation accurately perceives the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits to be ten percent, the rational corporations, and it may borrow if necessary to continue such operations. But nevertheless, almost all
corporations continue some marginal or even unprofitable operations for sustained periods. It
has been obsei:ved that cost cutting campaigns occur most commonly when the corporation
runs into a financial crisis, a finding that is inconsistent with the theoretical principle of wealth
maximization under which a firm should cut redundant costs and operations at all times, not
just when it incurs financial reversals. Even neo-classical economists have acknowledged the
validity of this critique of the traditional profit-maximization assumption. See Alchian, The
Basis of Some Recent Advances in the Theory ofManagement of the Firm, 14 J. INDUS, ECON,
30 (1965), reprinted in READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 131 (2d ed., w. Breit & H. Hochman
ed. 1971). In short, it appears that a financial crisis motivates the firm to reduce the degree of
"organizational slack" it tolerates, and a large fine seems likely to do so also, Moreover, even
in a highly profitable firm having no marginal or deficit operations, it is possible that the
company may be forced to reduce staff because of a sudden diminution of working capital
(caused by the fine) which it cannot recoup through borrowings. Financial institutions are
likely to be more reluctant to lend to the convicted corporation after the fine and may be
unwilling to increase outstanding lines of credit until convinced (possibly after a substantial
interval) that the first conviction and fine will not be followed by others. Additionally, a corporation deprived of a significant portion of its capital may be unable to expand production
and employment - a result which also should be counted as an externality caused by punishment.
51. See Note, Contribution and Antitrust Policy, 18 MICH. L. REV. 890, 906-07 (1980) ("A
company faced with this massive liability may have little choice but to settle and to surrender
its opportunity to go to trial on the merits of its case") (footnote omitted). See also Lempert,
Panic Aided Record Box Settlements, Legal Times of Wash., May 7, 1979, at I.
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tion would still settle such a "frivolous" action at $2.5 million
(because the discounted value of plaintifrs action is in realty $30
million multiplied by .10, or $3 million). In short, high authorized
penalties can produce extorted settlements. Although this danger is
less pronounced where the action is brought by a public enforcer, the
innocent corporation still may plead nolo contendere to avoid the
collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction in subsequent civil
litigation.
Empirical evidence brings another factor into the analysis: the
accused corporation often cannot afford the time interval necessary
to establish its innocence. Frequently, it has been reported that once
an antitrust indictment is filed, the defendant corporation experiences difficulties in obtaining credit from its current lenders because
of the enormous contingent liability overhanging its balance sheet. 52
Left without sources of funds in a capital intensive industry the corporation may find it :financially impossible not to plead nolo contendere or to settle the private suits that inevitably follow on the
heels of such an indictment. For example, the major forest product
companies were indicted in 1978 for allegedly fixing corrugated
container prices over a period of years. Private civil suits were filed
soon after the indictments, and the majority of the defendants settled, together paying an estimated $310 million. 53 Yet, two of the
largest defendants - The Continental Group and Mead Corporation - pleaded "not guilty" and were later acquitted. 54 Although an
acquittal does not necessarily mean the defendant is factually innocent, the disquieting possibility here is that only the largest corporations possessed sufficient :financial resources to fight over an
extended period in the face of potentially bankrupting liabilities. If
the reverberating impact of that $310 million in settlements resulted
in workers being laid off or in :financial injury to the pension funds
which typically hold the bonds of such corporations, then it is difficult to view such a settlement on untested (and apparently rebuttable) evidence as a victory for the public interest.
The point here is not simply that the concept of the private attorney general needs to be viewed with greater skepticism, but that remedies can sometimes be worse than the disease they were meant to
52. The founder of the Green Bay Packaging Company was recently quoted to the effect
that his company settled antitrust.charges because the existence of so large a contingent liability would otherwise have caused its lenders to cut off further borrowing. See Lewin, Justices
Take Key Trust Case, Natl. L.J., June 30, 1980, at 18, col. 1.
53. Rudnitsky & Blyskal, supra note 16, at 59.
54. Lempert, supra note 51, at 1.
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cure. Truism that this is, its significance in this context is profoundly
heretical. To illustrate, let us begin with a hypothetical case and
then tum to some actual ones. Suppose over the course of a number
of years, the leading producers of potato chips engage in a pricefixing conspiracy that raises the price of a bag of chips by three cents.
Given the volume of the market and the length of the conspiracy,
damages are reliably placed at $100 million, which when trebled results in a potential liability of $300 million. Nearly all of the recovery would go to large corporations which operate grocery stores and
to other institutional buyers (who, presumably, have passed the cost
along to unidentifiable individual consumers). The impact of this
penalty will devastate some of the conspirators, resulting in layoffs
and plant closings, and will inhibit the ability of all conspirators to
expand their work force. Creditors and suppliers of these corporate
conspirators may also suffer.
Who benefits? No "true" victim is compensated, because the
consumer receives nothing out of these settlements. Others may be
deterred, but the low risk of apprehension may still make the crime
attractive, particularly to middle and lower echelon corporate employees who see a cost/benefit trade-off different from that of their
firm. Even if we could compensate the real victims, the additional
three cents a bag paid by all consumers is a minor injury spread over
an extended period which is dwarfed by the concentrated injury visited on those who bear the "overspill" of the penalties imposed on
the corporate conspirators.
This example may seem atypical, and it is conceded that some
corporate crimes - such as those that threaten lives - justify such
draconian sanctions. But when we tum to actual cases, they seem to
have much in common with the potato chip case. 55 In the corrugated
containers case noted earlier, the settling defendants have agreed to
pay $310 million, but the estimated average award per member of
the plaintiff class is only $1,425. 56 In another recent class action antitrust suit against the leading manufacturers of folding cartons, the
total settlement was $218 million, and the average award per mem55. In a similar vein, economist Lester Thurow has analyzed the Federal Trade Commission's long prosecution of the major dry cereal producers. The FTC estimates that $1.2 billion
in extra charges resulted between 1958 and 1972 as a result of the oligopolistic structure of this
market. But this works out, he finds, to .1¢ per breakfast - "hardly one of the nation's pressing problems," as he puts it. Thurow questions whether this justifies the substantial dislocation
that an antitrust decree requiring divestiture might produce. See Thurow, Lei's Abolislr tire
Antitrust Laws, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, § 3 at 2. Unlike Professor Thurow, my answer is
not to repeal the antitrust laws, but to change the form of punishment we use to deter the
corporation.
56. Rudnitsky & Blyskal, supra note 16, at 59.
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ber of the class was $6,790.57 In these and other cases, the principle
that money has a declining marginal utility means that the defendants absorb a jolting loss while the plaintiffs (who are largely corporations) receive an individual recovery which is of minimal
significance to them.58 Even if damages were not trebled, the problem would remain because a cash fine telescopes into a single year
the far smaller gains received during the early years of an extended
conspiracy.
D.

The Nul!ffecation Problem

We have been examining two distinct negative consequences of
severe corporate penalties: the "overspill problem" (penalties fall
heavily on innocent or less-culpable parties) and the "extortion
problem" (the innocent may settle in the face of unacceptable potential liabilities which cannot be quickly rebutted). The first of these
problems helps to explain why sentencing courts have traditionally
imposed only modest penalties on corporations. An ounce of history
is here worth a pound of logic. At least until recently, the fines imposed for corporate offenders have been small and well below the
authorized ceilings. In the great electrical equipment price-fixing
conspiracy of the 1950s - the most famous and publicized price.fixing conspiracy in American history - the average fine each corporate offender paid was $16,550. 59 General Electric paid the largest
fine - $437,500 - but it amounted to only 0.1 % of its total pro:fit.60
Empirical studies show that the fines in the typical antitrust case seldom approach the authorized maximum. 61 At present, the maximum authorized fine stands at $1 million per count for corporate
antitrust violations, and a pending Senate bill would codify the same
57. Id. at 60.
58. Because money has a declining marginal utility, the severity of a fine increases disproportionately as its monetary value is raised. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 430 & n.27. This is so
because the higher the fine, the closer one is taken to his "bottom dollar"; each increment lost
is more highly valued.
Although this argument is less compelling in the case of corporate offenders than individuals, there is still a "bunching effect" associated with most corporate penalties which increases
their impact. Typically, the misconduct has continued over a sustained period, usually producing only modest annual revenues for the corporation. For example, Allied Chemical's
profit from Kepone never exceeded $600,000 per year. Zim, supra note 34, at 83. But when
compensatory damages are levied in a single year, even the modest gains that accrued over the
multi-year period are telescoped into a lump sum that may be enough to bankrupt the corporation. In addition, the gains from the crime may not be available to the corporation since they
may have been paid out to present and former stockholders as dividends.
59. K. ELZINGA & w. BREIT, supra note 28, at 56.
60. Id. The fine was also less than 0.3% of its net profit for the year.
61. See Posner, A Statistical Study ofAntitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. & EcoN. 365, 392
(1970) (average fine in antitrust cases between 1965 and 1969 was $116,622).
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ceiling for all corporate felonies. 62 Yet between 1967 and 1970 when
the maximum fine was a lowly $50,000 per count, the Justice Department recommended the imposition of the maximum fine in less than
a third of the cases where it obtained convictions. 63 If even the prosecutor will not recommend a penalty of $50,000 per count, it is little
wonder that the judges resist draconian sentences.
This pattern of nullification is by no means unique to the corporate context. Few phenomena are better established and more easily
observed in the administration of the criminal law than the nullification of severe penalties. 64 Both judges and juries seem instinctively
to resist the imposition of stem punishments. In the corporate context the defendant may not merit sympathy, but only the most obtuse
judge can fail to understand that such penalties will ultimately fall
on innocent parties. Indeed, even if an adamant judge decides to
impose a severe penalty, the defendant corporation might still be
able to dissuade him by hinting at the dire consequences and by
orchestrating a predictable political reaction. The scenario is not difficult to imagine. Notified that the court intends to impose a $25
million fine, the corporation informs politicians, union officials, and
community leaders that it may be forced to close its plants in their
communities. This shocking news galvanizes them into action, and a
political coalition is forged to save the threatened jobs. In short order, the court is inundated with letters, phone calls from Congressmen, and newspaper editorials. This is exactly what has happened in
the case of administrative enforcement action against some corporations. 65 Few courts would be wholly immune from the same pres62. 15 U.S.C. § l (1976). The penalties in the pending federal Criminal Code, S. 1722, are
contained in§ 220l(b), and in H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 3502(2) (1980).
63. K. ELZINGA &

w. BREIT, supra note 28, at

l.

64. The literature on nullification is lengthy. The seminal effort to link this phenomenon
to a theory of punishment is Michael and Wechsler, A Rationale ofthe Law ofHomicide I I, 37
CoLUM. L. Rev. 1261, 1265 (1937). For a recent examination of this concept in the context of
corporate crime, see Block & Sidak, The Cost ofAntitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price
Fixer Now and Then?, 68 Geo. L.J. 1131, 1134 n.20 (1980). In a succeeding section, this Article will argue that, to overcome this tendency toward nullification, the sentencing court must
be shown a compensatory purpose for the punishment.
65. See Reich, The Antitrust Industry, 68 Geo. L.J. 1053, 1062-63 n.34 (1980) (describing
several examples in which combined co=unity, political and even editorial opposition forced
the Federal Trade Commission to withdraw enforcement actions it had already commenced),
In one 1979 case, a voluntary plant closing laying off 1500 workers was the decisive factor
causing the F.T.C. to accept a result which it had secured a preliminary injunction to prevent,
Id.
Defendant corporations can also raise other arguments against fines. A fascinating example is supplied by the Consumer Product Safety Commission's decision, In re Bassett F11mit11re
Industries, Inc. See CPSC News Release, CPSC, Bassett F11mit11re Reach Consent Agreement
Over Crib Hazards, Feb. 14, 1980. Here, over the strong dissent of two commissioners, a
three-man majority of the Co=ission accepted a $175,000 civil penalty against a crib manu-
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sures if the threatened loss were great enough. 66
We face an apparent paradox: the low rates of apprehension and
the potentially high rewards that characterize much of corporate
criminal behavior make severe penalties necessary, but the overspill
problem makes such penalties seemingly unfair, the deterrence trap
makes their availability questionable, and the extortion problem
makes their e.ffect undesirable. This despairing description does not
mean, however, that penalties cannot be designed which have less
overspill and which reduce the judiciary's inclination to pull its
punches. One conclusion seems inescapable: the cash fine system
chiefly functions in the case of corporations as a kind of public morality tax, but not as a deterrent threat. 67 Alternative sanctions are
desperately required.
II.

THE INDIVIDUAL AS TARGET

At least two schools of thought exist as to whether penalties
should be focused on the individual executive or on the corporation.
The Chicago School favors punishing the corporation, and its reasorling is characteristically direct: if the penalties imposed on the
firm are sufficient to deter it, then it will take internal corrective acfacturer whose unsafe product had resulted in several fatal infant strangulations. A $1 million
fine was authorized, but the majority approved a consent agreement imposing the lesser fine in
return for the corporation's agreement to advertise the existence of the defect and to provide a
free repair kit. The dissenters believed that the corporation (with annual sales of$281 million)
could afford both the fine and the cost of advertising, but the majority was apparently concerned that the two might be mutually exclusive and was unwilling to accept further delay in
the commencement of the remedial program (which would be necessary if the Commission
were forced to sue). Id. This summary is also based on an April 18, 1980, interview with
Commissioner Sam Zagoria (a dissenter). The Bassel/ case suggests that corporations can effectively mitigate the authorized penalty structure through plea bargaining: here, the corporation is able to barter elimination of a threatened danger to consumers for a reduced sanction.
66. I recognize that rules of procedure and professional conduct restrict attempts to pressure or influence courts, in contrast to the manner in which administrative bodies may be
permissibly lobbied. Nonetheless, the sentencing process has always stood as a partial exception to this pattern. Typically, when a "white collar" executive faces sentence, the court will
receive an avalanche of mail from friends, ministers, and community leaders testifying to his
service to the community and the hardship that a prison sentence would work on others. From
this starting point, it is but a short step to letters, petitions, and editorials asking courts not to
impose draconian penalties which will require the closing of a local plant. Indeed, union officials have here shown themselves to be the natural allies of corporate management by testifying against increases in the authorized penalties for price-fixing on the ground that such higher
penalties would fall on workers. See Hearings on Legislation To Strengthen Penalties Under the
Antitn1St Laws Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 86, 91
(1962) (unions express concern over adverse implications for workers as a result of increased
corporate penalties for antitrust offenses).
67. A counter-argument might still be made that, although such fines are inadequate to
deter the corporation, they still can be passed on to the individual manager through derivative
actions and lawsuits authorized by the proxy rules. At present, however, the obstacles to a
successful action for damages under either the proxy rules or through a derivative suit appear
to be overwhelming. See note 70 1iifra.
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tion to prevent misconduct by its agents for which it is legally responsible. 68 One point can be made in favor of this argument: the
firm is better positioned than the state to detect misconduct by its
employees. It has an existing monitoring system already focused on
them, and it need not conform its use of sanctions to due process
standards. Indeed, if the penalties are severe enough, the corporation has both the incentive and, typically, the legal right to dismiss
any employee it even suspects of illegal conduct.
A rebuttal of the Chicago view emerges from our earlier analysis:
it is seldom clear that penalties can be made high enough to deter the
corporation because of the "deterrence-trap" problem. If the risk of
apprehension and conviction is low, or if potential offenders perceive
it to be low, the corporation may see its convicted agent not as a
reckless :fiduciary, but as simply an unlucky casualty. If pressured
the corporation may dismiss him, but as long as the expected gains
from his actions exceed the expected punishment costs, it has little
reason to tighten its monitoring system.
In addition to the deterrence-trap problem, the question of externalities must once again be considered. Even if a severe penalty imposed on the firm is adequate to trigger an internal disciplinary
response, it will have adverse consequences as well: reduced corporate solvency, an increased risk of bankruptcy, possible layoffs and
closings of marginal plants, and injury to stockholders and creditors.
As suggested earlier, these consequences can sometimes be more
harmful than the crime itself, particularly where they are borne by a
narrow class and the injury caused by the crime is widely diffused.
The Chicago School position may therefore show mercy to the corporate executive (who is saved from the possibility of incarceration
by the recommendation of a corporate focus), but it imposes a harsh
penalty on the less privileged classes (such as employees, consumers,
and others dependent on the corporation) who bear the indirect burden of corporate penalties.
There are other reasons to question the adequacy of penalties focused exclusively on the firm: evidence of internal discipline within
large corporations is conspicuously absent at senior corporate
levels; 69 stockholders who wish the corporation to steer well clear of
legal risks may be unable to control managers whose own self-inter68. See R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 236.
69. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 445, 458-59; Loving, How Bob Rowen Served His Time,
FORTUNE, Aug. 27, 1979, at 44; Jensen, Watergate .Donors Still Riding High, N.Y. Times, Aug.
24, 1975, at l, col. l; Nathan, Coddled Criminals, HARPER'S, Jan. 1980, at 30-33. These case
studies suggest that the corporation becomes sufficiently embarrassed to fire the convicted senior executive only when he is imprisoned (and rarely even then).
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est lies in such risk-taking;70 and some managers may be extreme or
even irrational "risk preferrers" who gain enjoyment from the gamble.71
All this suggests that penalties should be focused on the actual
decision-maker rather than the corporation. Another important
characteristic of corporate misconduct cuts in favor of such a policy
prescription: the corporate manager rarely receives any direct pecuniary benefit or gain from his illegal actions on behalf of his corporation. In part, this is so because his conduct is almost always hidderr
from senior management. If the pecuniary gain to the corporation
exceeds the gain to the manager, then the manager should be more
easily deterred. In short, the deterrence trap is not a barrier in the
case of the individual because (1) the expected gain is less, and so the
expected punishment cost can exceed it, and (2) there is no wealth
boundary on the maximum penalty since the executive, unlike the
fl.mi, can be imprisoned.
But the analysis cannot stop at this point. For in some circumstances, the executive may find that the expected punishment cost is
exceeded by the cost of internal corporate sanctions which will befall
him if he refuses to violate a legal norm. This internal sanction may
consist of an outright penalty (demotion or dismissal) or a lost op70. In particular, under current law, shareholders may be precluded from holding management responsible for fines or other damages caused by illegal action through derivative suits.
See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S.
1073 (1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979);
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963); Dent, The Power of
.Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The .Death ofthe .Derivative Suit?, 15 Nw. U. L.
R.Ev. 96 (1980); Note, Pleading and Proofof.Damages in Shareholders' .Derivative Actions Based
on Antitrust Convictions, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 175 (1964).
Similar attempts under the proxy rules to hold corporate officials liable for illegal payments
which they made, authorized or tolerated have generally run afoul of the ''transaction causation" doctrine. Under this doctrine, unless the making of such a payment was directly or
indirectly the subject of the solicitation, the misstatement in the proxy statement cannot be said
to have legally "caused" the illicit action. See Lewis v. Elam, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Meer v. United Brands, [19761977 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,648 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). As a result, neither
the derivative suit nor the direct suit under the proxy rules is likely to be attractive to the
contingent-fee motivated plaintiffs' attorney on whom the deterrent threat of these civil sanctions here depends.
71. The "Begelman affaif' in Hollywood, in which a high corporate executive blatantly
diverted funds from employees, suggests that such managers exist. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 4,
1977, at 53, col. 1. Similarly, the Equity Funding case in which corporate executives forged
bogus insurance policies in order to report fictitious profits shows a reckless attitude toward
legal risks which were almost certain to mature. See generally N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1975, at
75, col. 7. Indeed, there is the intriguing possibility that smaller firms within an industry may
decide to compete against larger entrants by accepting a higher degree oflegal risk. One study
of the much-criticized Velsicol Corporation (which has repeatedly been involved in environmental and toxic law violations) reached the conclusion that Velsicol entered high-risk areas
that its larger competitors tended to avoid. See Klein, Under Attack: Small Chemical Firm
Has Massive Problems With Toxic Products, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1978, at 12, col. 3.
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portunity (nonpromotion or denial of an anticipated fringe benefit).
To be sure, these internal sanctions are far less severe than is a felony conviction (even without a prison term), but the probability of
their application is much higher. Put more simply, the risk of punishment by the corporation may be much greater than the risk of
punishment by the legal system. For example, assume that a hypothetical division manager knows that a particular foreign arms sale is
important to his corporation, and that senior management expects
him to consummate the deal. To assure the sale, he need only make
an illegal payment to a foreign government official. In so doing, he
runs the risk of a felony conviction, yet failure to make the payment
may result in his replacement as the division manager. Although his
corporate superiors will rarely instruct him explicitly to engage in an
illegal act, they may nevertheless proclaim their insistence on "accountability" and "management by results." In all likelihood, our
hypothetical division manager sees criminal conviction as a far more
severe sanction than dismissal, but also as a far more remote risk.
His dilemma may emerge more clearly ifwe quantify it: suppose the
manager views conviction as three times as severe a penalty as dismissal, but there is no more than a 25% chance of conviction. Conversely, there may be a 75% likelihood that he will lose his position if
the payment is not made and the contract is lost. Under these assumptions, the two expected punishment costs - one public and one
private - come out exactly equal, and hence his behavior as a rational actor is indeterminate. Change the assumptions only slightly,
and the private "expected punishment cost" exceeds the public one.
Internal corporate discipline may therefore counterbalance, or
even overcome, more severe public sanctions because it has a higher
probability of application. To some degree this problem is unavoidable, but it need not be aggravated. Focusing exclusively on the individual decision-maker would encourage exactly such disciplinary
behavior within the corporation. Very large firms view middle-level
managers as a fungible commodity that can be sacrificed as convenient scapegoats and easily replaced. Senior managers can piously
express appropriate shock at their subordinates' actions while still
demanding strict "accountability" on the part of such managers for
short-term operating results. 72
Thus, a dual focus on the firm and the individual is necessary.
Neither can be safely ignored. However, this unsurprising conclusion only takes us back to the deterrence trap and the externality
72. See BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 42, at 196; Getschow, supra note 43; Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 44.
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problem. How can we adequately punish the firm so that an internal
disciplinary response is triggered, without also producing prohibitively adverse social consequences? To this topic we now turn.
III.

OPTIMIZING CORPORATE DETERRENCE: FROM
DESCRIPTION TO PRESCRIPTION

The preceding sections have argued that both real and perceived
externalities associated with corporate punishment have restrained
courts and legislators in authorizing and imposing penalties on a corporation. This Section will argue that it is therefore desirable to find
"socially cheaper" methods of punishing the corporation. This notion of social economy does not imply less severe penalties, but
rather penalties which minimize both the real and the apparent overspill of the costs of deterrence onto the nonculpable. Concededly,
any assertion that there can be "socially cheaper" penalties may
seem unintelligible to the neo-classical economist. If one proceeds
from the assumption that the "expected punishment cost" must exceed the expected gain before the firm will act to prevent criminal
behavior by its agents, 73 then our quandary may be insoluble, at
least for crimes having a low risk of apprehension. But from a behavioral perspective, which examines the internal dynamics within
the firm, we can identify leverage points where a parsimonious use of
penalties directed at the firm may still be effective.
An analogy may help clarify this difference in approach: both
the neo-classical economist and the conventional liberal politician
seem to have agreed that fines will not work unless they are severe.
Under a regime of harsh penalties, the state simply bludgeons the
corporation into compliance. Such a strategy reminds one of two
giant sumo wrestlers circling each other before the charge: force
meets force in a head-on conflict, and innocent' parties may get trampled in the ensuing havoc. There is an alternative: to extend this
analogy, the judo wrestler relies not on brute force, but rather turns
his opponent's own strength against him. The violence is controlled;
the innocent less subject to injury. Similarly, the behavioral perspective suggests opportunities for controlled uses of force which, like the
judo expert, exploit the target's own internal forces and tensions.
George Orwell demonstrates in 1984 that every man has some
subconscious fear which society can bring to bear against him.
While Orwell's example terrifies us, it can also instruct us as to how
society might harness the internal forces within the firm to enhance
13. See text at notes 10-11 supra.
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the deterrent threat of the law. Specifically, to deter corporate crime
more effectively, one might sensibly begin by exploring the principal
fears and interests of the manager, and then match the consequences
of a criminal conviction to them. Several possibilities suggest themselves: (1) much evidence suggests that corporate managers fear a
hostile take-over of their firm, which would typically be accomplished through a tender offer;74 (2) the manager's self-interest is
very much identified with the value of the firm's stock, and stock
options, phantom options, stock bonus plans, and other forms of incentive compensation cement such a linkage; (3) the competitive
struggle for advancement and promotion within the firm implies that
managers identified publicly as having been involved in corporate
misconduct will be disadvantaged in their opportunities for advancement (both internally and externally with other firms); 75 (4) there is a
general fear within most organizations of loss of autonomy; any intrusion into the sphere in which the manager sees himself as autonomous will be resented and resisted. 76 Penalties that play on these
fears and interests may effectively increase deterrence. Finally, private litigation in the form of the derivative suit may evade nullification by transferring costs imposed upon the corporation to the
responsible officials (who may view the penalty as substantial because it is a large percentage of their net worth). Thus, the possibilities for efficient integration of civil and criminal enforcement deserve
particular attention. How these forces might be harnessed in the aftermath of a criminal conviction of a corporation will be the focus of
this Section.
74. The following summary seems correct beyond question: "Managers gain psychological
rewards from their positions of authority within the corporation. Leadership of a successful
company brings a manager power and prestige; the possibility of losing these benefits is regarded by managers as a traumatic experience." Note, The Co,!fiict Between Managers and
Shareholders in .Divers!fying Acquisitions: A Porrfolio Theory Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238,
1243 (1979). A hostile takeover frequently results in the replacement of senior management
and is thus defended against with extraordinary zeal by the incumbent senior management.
For such a case study, see Flaherty & Greene, Oxy v. Mead: The Big One of 1978, FORBES,
Dec. 11, 1978, at 63. Because it increases the threat of a hostile takeover, the equity fine will
provide senior management a considerable incentive to police middle-level management,
where most crime within the corporation occurs. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
75. Professor Posner has based his theory that enforcement should focus on the firm on the
premise that employees fired for misconduct cannot find equivalent employment elsewhere.
See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 226 (1976). SEC proxy rules also discourage the promotion
of an executive with a criminal record to high office within a public corporation. See SEC v.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing, 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978); SEC v. Kalves, 425 F. Supp. 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cooke v. Teleprompter, 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
76. See A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1966); M. MACCODY, THE GAMESMAN passim
(1976); V. THOMPSON, MODERN ORGANIZATION 24 (1961); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE
CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 47-51 (1970).
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The Equity Fine: Toward a More Focused
"Capital Punishment"

The time has come for a basic policy assertion: when very severe
fines need to be imposed on the corporation, they should be imposed
not in cash, but in the equity secu.rities of the corporation.77 The
convicted corporation should be required to authorize and issue such
number of shares to the state's crime victim compensation fund as
would have an expected market value equal to the cash fine necessary to deter illegal activity.78 The fund should then be able to liquidate the securities in whatever manner maximizes its return. 79
This strategy reduces the earlier encountered obstacles to adequate corporate deterrence: (1) the overspill of corporate penalties to
workers and consumers is reduced, and the costs of deterrence are
concentrated exclusively on the stockholder; (2) in tum, the nullification phenomenon may be reduced, since the latent threat to employees and the community dependent on the corporation that a cash fine
carries is no longer present; (3) much higher penalties (in terms of
total monetary value) can be imposed, because the market valuation
of the typical corporation vastly exceeds the cash resources available
to it (with which a cash fine might be paid); (4) the manager's self77. While I refer to the fine in general terms of equity securities of the corporation, the fine
should be imposed in the form of common stock. In theory, the equity fine could be levied in a
different form of equity security (e.g., preferred stock or warrants) or perhaps as a debenture. I
see no need to discuss these variants in any detail, but their common deficiency is that senior
equity holders have traditionally been exposed to oppression by a management which identifies with the interests of the common stockholder. See, e.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp.,
53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del), qffd., 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940). The possibility of such essentially unreviewable
mistreatment seems even greater when the senior class is created by judicial order so as to
make the common shareholders resentful and unwilling to accept the senior's entitlement to
priority.
In this Article, I will not discuss the accounting treatment which would be necessary to
support imposition of a fine in the form of common stock in a state which requires shares to be
issued for a par value. However, this problem seems easily surmountable because the issuance
can be seen as cancelling an equivalent cash liability that the corporation owed to the state.
78. The court would determine the number of shares to be issued by first finding the optimal fine under the economic formula discussed at note 11 supra. Then the court would order
the issuance of the number of shares having a pre-indictment value equal to the fine. See note
8l i,!fra as to the use of pre-indictment values.
79. Crime victim compensation funds are now in operation in varying forms in several
jurisdictions. The funds compensate victims of many types of crime; the fine paid by a defendant corporation would therefore not necessarily compensate the particular victims of its behavior. See J. HUDSON & P. GALAWAY, RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1977). Such a fund
is contemplated by the pending Federal Criminal Code, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4111
(1979) ("Establishment of a Victim Compensation Fund"). Professor Roy Schotland has persuaded me that the fund should be administered by an independent trustee operating under
the traditional principles of fiduciary administration applicable to pension plans and mutual
funds, rather than by a civil service-type agency. A trustee should be obligated only to maximize the recovery to the beneficiaries of the fund and, absent additional factors, should owe no
fiduciary duty directly to the corporation.
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interest is better aligned with that of the corporation because the resulting per-share decline in the corporation's common stock following such a penalty will reduce the value of stock options and other
incentive compensation available to him; (5) the manager will fear
that the creation of a large marketable block of securities makes the
corporation an inviting target for a takeover; and (6) the typical
stockholder's apparent focus on short-term profit maximization will
now have to take into account the risks of illegal behavior; acco!dingly, the stock value of legally "risky" companies will predictably
decline, and stockholders will begin to demand increased internal
controls within corporations to reduce such legal exposure. Each of
these assertions is, of course, subject to qualifications, and each merits a brief analysis.
The most important of these advantages is also the most obvious:
although common stock is virtually a cash equivalent, the burden of
the equity fine falls very differently than that of cash fines. Little
impact on employees, creditors or suppliers seems likely from the
equity fine, since the capital of the corporation is not depleted. 80
Nor would an equity fine prevent corporate expansion or require
layoffs of employees. Cash fines, in contrast, may conceivably produce more harm than the illegal conduct. For example, because concealment of toxic or environmental violations is relatively simple, the
optimal fine might have to be very high (even though the demonstrated damage was low). In an extreme case, the optimal fine might
equal ten percent of the aggregate market value of the corporation's
common stock. Such a cash fine - if indeed the corporation could
pay it - would probably inhibit corporate expansion, cause plant
closings and layoffs, and reduce the value of the corporation's bonds
and other debt securities (because of the increased "riskiness" of the
now depleted corporation). An equivalent equity fine would require
only that the company issue a quantity of shares having a pre-indictment value equal to the optimal cash fine (in this case, if nine million
shares were outstanding, then one million additional shares would
be issued).81
80. Employees do suffer some loss from the equity fine to the extent that they hold stock
options or are the beneficiaries of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) or receive incentive compensation based on the market price of the security (i.e., "phantom stock options").
This loss will be felt by middle and upper echelon officials, but will be less severe than the loss
which a layoff represents to a worker and may be a means of realigning the officials' selfinterest with that of the corporation.
81. I assume that the pre-indictment value should be used to avoid the double-counting
effect which would result if the market discounted the impact of the equity fine before it was
imposed by decreasing the value of the corportion's shares. The problem of finding a stable
valuation date for shares is one with which corporate lawyers are amply experienced in other
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In essence, the equity fine would have no more effect on the corporation's solvency than if an equivalent stock dividend were issued
to its stockholders. To be sure, the dilutive effect of such an issuance
will reduce the per-share value of the common stock, but an
equivalent cash fine might have an even greater impact on the corporation's stock value since the risk that the enterprise will go bankrupt
would substantially increase in the aftermath of a cash fine. For example, the consequence of an equity fine equal to 25% of the outstanding shares after the fine should be to reduce the value of each
shareholder's investment in the corporation by 25%. A cash fine in a
similar amount would very likely cause bankruptcy or, at the least, a
considerably greater decline in the market value of the corporation's
shares because of the corporation's reduced capital. In other words,
because cash fines reduce the corporation's ability to weather future
financial reversals and to undertake new opportunities, the risk of
bankruptcy increases, its prospects for growth falter, and investors
will discount its shares (to reflect the increased risk) to a degree that
is greater than the proportionate dilution incident to the equity fine.
Not only are employees and creditors relatively unaffected by reallocation of equity ownership, but also the cost of the fine is less
likely to be effectively passed on to the consumer in the form of
higher prices. This is so for two reasons: first, there is no short-term
financial crisis which might tempt corporate managers to experiment
with higher prices, and second, even if the corporation possesses sufficient monopoly power to raise prices, at least the increased revenues will be shared with the former victims, who are now
contexts. It is usually solved by taking a thirty-day average of the closing market price prior to
the announcement. q. Bums, The Competitive lijfect of Trust-Busting: A Por!falio Analysis,
85 J. POL. ECON. 730-34 (1977) (filing of complaint by government has dramatic effect on stock
prices).
Corporate lawyers are, of course, aware that the issuance of shares and their resale by an
underwriter (a term which could include such a fund if it took "with a_ view'to distribution")
requires registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77(aa) (1976). This
would entail considerable costs and delay. However, several exemptions from this registration
requirement are available. First, the private placement exemption - § 4(2) - could be utilized for the issuance of the shares to the fund (because the fund would be a true institutional
investor), and the. resale of such shares could be made pursuant to rule 144 or a separate
private placement. In addition, the exemption under § 3(b) of the Act for small issuances
could also be utilized in many cases. Even if the compensation fund were not the recipient, the
shares could be distributed to actual victims of the crime pursuant to exemption afforded by
§ 3(a)(l0), which provides an exemption for judicially or administratively approved issuances
which are in exchange (including partial exchange) for "outstanding . . . claims or property
interests." The theory here would be that the victims of crimes have claims against the corporation and could exchange such claims in return for the shares. Resale ordinarily would be
exempt under§ 4(1). The SEC could also exempt most such issuances from the registration
requirement by a rule adopted under section 3(b). Even if registration were required, the costs
of this process could be borne by the defendant corporation.
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shareholders, if indirectly, through the victim compensation fund.
This result may not protect the consumer in the short run, but it does
mean that the equity fine cannot be seen as a cost of doing business
because it is substantially less recoupable than a cash fine.
The impact of the equity fine on every group having an interest
in the corporation except stockholders is negligible, and even the impact on stockholders can be measured and limited. In contrast, a
cash fine of similar magnitude has unforeseeable effects because Jt
may set off a chain of falling dominoes. To sum up, the equity fine
simply subdivides the corporate pie into more and smaller pieces,
and then redistributes a limited number of the pieces to the broad
class of crime victims.
This analysis leads to the second obvious question: would the
equity fine's avoidance of the adverse side effects of corporate punishment produce less judicial and prosecutorial nullification? In
short, would more severe penalties be imposed? To a substantial degree, the answer to this question depends on how sympathetically
courts view the stockholder, on whom the equity fine imposes the
cost of deterrence. Here, the logic of deterrence is cold and cruel:
the more the stockholder's shares are subject to dilution through
equity fines, the greater his interest in preventive and monitoring
controls within the corporation. Nevertheless, courts frequently temper justice with sentiment, and the equity fine may be viewed by
some courts as an unjust penalty which falls on "innocent" shareholders while cash fines fall on the "evil" corporation. Fallacious as
such a distinction between the firm and its shareholders is, a sentencing court may unconsciously assume it, unless the equity fine can be
presented as fair as well as efficient. Four arguments can be made,
however, why equity fines are indeed fairer than cash penalties.
First, the use of such a fine is less severe because it averts future
corporate insolvency. Second, the proceeds of the equity fine will
fund a general purpose victim compensation fund (thus permitting
the court to view itself as engaging in humanitarian fundraising
rather than as simply imposing a penalty). Third, the equity fine
falls evenly across an entire class (e.g., stockholders), while the burden of cash fines imposed on the corporation ultimately falls disproportionately on a few (e.g., those laid off, the community
surrounding a specific plant that is closed, etc.). The loss is more
diffused in another sense as well: few stockholders hold only one
security while most employees hold only one job. This last point that equity fines produce "cost spreading" over a larger class -
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utilizes a neutral fairness criterion, 82 and thus we avoid the more
controversial socioeconomic assertion that stockholders can afford
the cost better than lower paid employees. Fourth and finally, stockholders have a potential means of redress: they can seek to pass on
the penalty to responsible officials through derivative suits. Once
equity fines become prevalent, it can also be argued that stockholders "assumed the risk" by investing in such a company.
All these justifications for imposing costs on shareholders seem
superior to the traditional rationale, which is that since the shareholders received indirectly the benefit of the crime, the should also
bear the burden of punishment to cancel out the "unjust enrichment."83 Such a rationale is misleading because it hides both (1) the
need to elevate the "expected punishment cost" to a level well in
excess of the actual gain in order to compensate for the low risk of
apprehension and (2) the possibility that the stockholders who benefited from the crime are not the same as those who now bear the cost
of the penalty. 84
Finally, the equity fine reduces the incongruence between the interests of managers and shareholders. From the managers' perspective, two negative consequences flow from a substantial equity fine:
first, by increasing the number of outstanding shares it reduces the
per share value of the corporation's stock, and this in tum has devastating consequences for outstanding stock options held by management officials. In this light, the equity fine partially falls upon senior
and middle management officials (whereas the cash fine may have
an impact on lower level employees). Given the difficulty of identifying the truly blameworthy official in many instances of corporate
misbehavior, this characteristic of the equity fine may be desirable.
Given that the responsibility for a decision is often too diffused to
isolate a single culprit with sufficient confidence to impose criminal
sanctions, the equity fine responds to this problem by spreading a
82. For an argument that cost spreading reduces the perceived intensity of an injury and
makes its imposition seem fairer, see G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 40 (1970).
83. q: McAdams, The Appropriate Sanctionsfar Corporate Criminal Liability: An Eclectic
Alternative, 46 U. CINN. L. REv. 989, 994-95 (1978) (shareholders derive the benefit from
illegal activities).

84. Although a number of commentators have approved this "unjust enrichment" rationale, I think they are unconsciously motivated by a desire for retribution rather than for deterrence. Cancelling out the profit may achieve retribution, but it will not deter unless the risk of
apprehension is equal to 100% (in which case an insanity defense should be permitted). A
retributive rationale for corporate punishment also becomes suspect when one realizes that the
stockholder-beneficiaries of corporate misbehavior may well have (and, to some extent, certainly have) sold their shares in the secondary market prior to the crime's discovery.
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modest penalty among the relatively narrow class which may have
shared responsibility for the decision.
A second consequence of an equity fine is to place a large marketable bloc of the corporation's securities in the hands of the trustee
who manages the victim compensation fund. This in tum raises a
possibility that the convicted corporation will become the target of a
hostile takeover. To the aggressive corporate suitor, such a bloc supplies the necessary toehold acquisition from which to launch a
tender offer or other campaign for control. 85 Empirically, it is evident that incumbent managers fear takeovers and take elaborate precautions against them. Thus, to the extent that the equity fine raises
the probability of a takeover, we create a sanction - which is virtually costless to society - by which to dissuade corporate managers
from criminal behavior. Predictably, where senior management sees
its own position in office threatened by the criminal behavior of
subordinate middle management officials, it will install greater internal controls than when the only consequence is a modest cash fine to
the organization and possibly the criminal prosecution of the
subordinate. In this sense, the equity fine stmctures a limited degree
of vicarious responsibility into the criminal justice system: senior officials are not held criminally liable for the acts of their subordinates,
but their positions are indirectly placed in jeopardy. Thus, to return
to the earlier analogy of the sumo wrestler and the judo expert, society here uses a force internal to the firm - fear of a potential takeover - to increase deterrence without creating externalities.
The effect of the equity fine on the stockholder may be even more
desirable. In a well-known essay, Professor Walter Werner has argued that the conduct of top managers is substantially influenced by
the stockholders' desire for short-term capital appreciation. 86 From
this perspective, the corporate manager who makes illegal payments
or evades environmental regulations has not breached the stockholders' trust, but instead is faithfully pursuing their desires. The market
in effect demands misconduct, and the manager responds to that de85. See A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 1 (1978)
("large blocks of stock in institutional hands" makes a corporation a target for tender offer).
The victim compensation fund here contemplated seems as much an "institutional investor" as
are pension plans.
In addition, it is commonly observed that the typical target of the hostile tender offer is the
cash-rich corporation whose liquid assets could fuel further expansion by the raider. Here, the
contrast between the cash fine and the equity fine is even more marked: the former depletes
cash reserves and makes the defendant to this degree a less inviting target, while the latter
leaves a cash-rich corporation an equally inviting, but even more vulnerable, target.
86. See Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 388 (1977). See also note 44 supra.
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mand out of a fear that otherwise the marketplace will discount the
value of his firm's shares. Others have also recently theorized that
investors in the contemporary stock market have a short-run focus,
and place little emphasis on the long-run adverse consequences. 87
If the premise that stock market pressures induce at least some
forms of corporate misconduct is correct, the equity fine is a punishment which truly fits the crime, for its primary effect is t_o_ dampen
stock market pressure for the aggressive pursuit of illicit short-term
gain. In tum, if top managers do respond to stock market influences
(as Professor Werner suggests), an investing public more sensitive to
corporate crime may produce a more cautious top management that
would install greater internal auditing controls to restrain lower echelon managers. In the end, even if the lower-tier manager is oblivious to the ,stock market, his behavior can be influenced through the
positive and negative incentives manipulated by senior management,
incentives which today pressure for short-term earnings growth.
Not only does the equity fine focus the penalty on the stockholder, but it also permits the imposition of a more severe fine. A
basic principle of microeconomics - that the value of the firm as a
going concern is the discounted present value of its expected future
earnings - will explain this point. 88 This "going concern value" of
the firm typically exceeds its "book" and "liquidating" values. As a
result, a cash fine faces a lower maximum boundary because it cannot be paid out of expected earnings (which may never be earned).
Even the established corporation would have trouble borrowing
from lenders at a level in excess of its book value based only on the
shaky security of anticipated earnings. Yet it is precisely this source
of value - the expected earnings - which the equity fine can tap,
because stock prices are a function of expected earnings.
Moreover, in those cases where the profits of an illegal activity
will continue into the future, the equity fine also automatically adjusts the penalty upward to reduce unjust enrichment. No matter
how great such profits are, they must fl.ow to new stockholders in the
proportion that the equity fine bears to the total number of shares.
The utility of an equity fine comes into clearer focus when we
consider the not uncommon case of a young company with highgrowth prospects, low book value, limited cash resources, and little
81. See BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 42; Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 44; Lome, Book
Review, 77 MICH. L. REV. 543, 547 (1979).
88. Cf. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 1-78 (2d ed. 1979); Kripke, A. Search far a Meaning/ii/ Securities .Disclosure .Policy, 31
Bus. LAW. 293 (1975) (value of firm discounted present worth of future net cash flow).
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borrowing capacity. Because of its expected earnings growth, the
stock of such a company may trade at a high price-earnings multiple.
It is essentially immune from high cash fines because it has only
modest liquid assets, and in part for this reason it may be tempted to
risk illegal activities. 89 An equity fine permits society to reach the
company's future earnings today by seizing a share of the firm's equity (which is, of course, equal in value to the market's perception of
the discounted present value of those earnings).
In short, the equity fine permits the imposition of much more
severe penalties than are possible under a cash fine system. Not only
are we able to outflank the "deterrence trap" by this means, but we
can also do so without producing the externalities which can make
the punishment more harmful than the crime. The immediate relevance of this point is, however, that its significance would not be lost
on the stock market. Because the equity fine can vastly exceed the
cash fine, the stock market will begin to discount the securities of
those companies perceived to be vulnerable to future criminal prosecutions. This leads in turn to a unique result: punishment will, to a
degree, precede the crime as companies perceived to be run in a
manner that encourages illegal behavior will see their stock values
decline. As noted earlier, corporate managers will have an incentive
to institute preventive monitoring controls to forestall this decline just as today they have an apparently more than adequate incentive
to maximize short-term profits. Managers who fail to convince the
stock market that their companies are reasonably protected against
such legal risks will see their company's stock value decline thereby inviting a take-over by other firms which think they can do a
superior job. Thus, we have come full circle to the idea that the law
can use competition among firms and within firms to enhance the
deterrent threat of the law.
The equity fine opens still other opportunities for creative legal
engineering. For example, the amount of the equity fine could be
graduated, increasing substantially with each succeeding criminal
conviction within a de.fined time period: e.g. , a fine of shares equal
to one percent of the outstanding stock with the first conviction, five
percent with the second, and twenty percent with the third. 90 This
89. In addition, there is the possibility that smaller firms may be more willing to accept risk
as a means of competition with larger, more established entrants in a market. See note 71
supra.
90. Of course, a cash fine could also be increased with subsequent convictions, at least in
theory. However, because of the problems of nullification and overspill discussed earlier, it is
less likely that a court would to the same extent increase cash fines for habitual corporate
offenders.
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enhanced penalty for the recidivist corporation would serve to direct
the stock market's disapproval to those companies which, by repeated delinquencies, have subjected themselves to potentially draconian equity fines. 91 Under such a system of fines, it seems
doubtful that management could survive in office despite a series of
corporate criminal convictions; others with greater credibility in the
view of the market, who could therefore restore the discounted loss
in market values, would replace the old managers. Additionally, the
issuance of such a large bloc of new securities could serve as a vehicle for the temporary appointment of special "public interest" directors (as some reformers have urged). 92 This is possible because the
victim compensation fund may receive a bloc sufficiently large to
empower it to select at least a minority of the board members. Admittedly, the impact of special constituency directors can be viewed
with some skepticism,93 but the important point is that the equity
fine provides a virtually automatic means for replacement of the directors and management of habitual corporate offenders.
All this leads to an ironic result: for years, the field of securities
law has seen a debate over how expansively its critical concept of
materiality should be defined. On the one hand, "liberal" proponents of a doctrine called "ethical materiality" have argued that the
corporation's disclosure should encompass all matters bearing on the
integrity and social performance of the corporation and its officers. 94
Conversely, those of a more "tough-minded" persuasion have replied that shareholders in fact pay little heed to such data, and are
interested only in information which affects expected earnings per
share. 95 Empirically, the case for the latter school is strong. The
91. Recidivist sentencing statutes are in force in most jurisdictions for individual offenders.
See 3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 18-4.4 at 278-90
(2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]. See also MODEL PENAL CODE,§ 7.03,
comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). But in the case of organizational offenders, the only
parallel is the "RICO" ("Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations") statute which is
triggered by a "pattern of racketeering activity," a term the statute defines to mean two alleged
offenses within a ten-year period that need not have resulted in prior convictions. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). Regrettably, however, the RICO statute is a nightmare of overbroad draftsmanship. It hardly meets the need for a recidivist penalty structure for organizations.
92. See C. STONE, supra note 20, at 152-84. The SEC has also repeatedly obtained outside
directors as a condition for settling its enforcement cases. See note 176 i,!fra.
93. See Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of .Directors: Fond Hope - Faint
Promise, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1978).
94. See Stevenson, The SEC and the New .Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50 (1976);
Sande & Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the Sky! Wash the
Wind!", 16 How. L.J. 831 (1971).
95. See Mann, Watergate to Bananagate: What Lies Beyond?, 31 Bus. LAW. 1663 (1976);
Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder
Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 185-86 (1979).
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available data seem to show that publicity about a corporation's illegal activities does not cause the price of its stock to decline, 96 thus
suggesting that the opponents of "ethical materiality" were right.
But as penalties are made more severe, the gap between the ethical
investor as a normative concept and the economic investor as an empirical reality begins to close. As penalties increase, the hard-boiled
investor becomes interested in the corporation's posture vis-a-vis
such topics as the environment, design safety, and discrimination.because he cannot afford not to be concerned.
Having now presented the case for the equity fine, what objections to it seem likely? Three stand out: (1) it will deny capital to
certain unavoidably risk-prone industries (such as those producing
toxic wastes) and thus interfere with the process of "re-industrialization;" (2) it is unconstitutional; and (3) even if constitutional, it is
such an abhorrent form of "creeping nationalization" that no legislature would ever authorize it. Each objection needs only a brief response.
First, the equity fine interferes less with the process of capital
formation than does the cash fine, because only the latter actually
depletes capital. Although such an equity sanction may make it difficult for some companies to market offerings of their equity securities, the simple fact is that for the past decade few corporations have
used common stock issuances as a means of raising capital. 97 The
most popular and heavily predominating purpose of equity issuances
has been to serve as the currency for merger and acquisitions and to
provide incentive compensation for managers. To the extent the
sanction restricts these goals of the firm, one might argue that this is
less a liability than a serendipitous benefit of the approach.
A related argument is that the equity fine will taint certain disfavored industries because the investor will be unable to distinguish
the varying criminal liabilities of high risk and low risk companies in
the same industry. Admittedly, the individual investor cannot undertake such an exhaustive analysis, but he need not. The professional security analyst has demonstrated the ability to evaluate
complex technologies, to distinguish qualitative differences in managements, and to appraise other forms of internal control systems. 98
96. See Note, Disclosure ofPayments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities
Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1855 n.45 (1976); Hetherington, supra note 95, at 186 (noting
that in proxy votes, shareholders have always rejected attempts to forbid such payments by
management).
97. For a summary of recent statistics, see Is Desperation the Mother ofInvention?, FORD ES,
May 12, 1980, at 52.
98. Those who accept the "efficient market" theory that stock market prices reflect the
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There is little reason to doubt that, if the stakes are high enough, the
analyst can tum his attention to the question of legal risk as well.
Moreover, management has every incentive to demonstrate its efforts
to him. Finally, here as elsewhere, a company's track record will be
predictive of the future: companies with a record of prior convictions pose higher risks than those that have never been convicted.
This is particularly the case under an equity fine system that substantially increases the amount of the penalty for recidivist corporations.
Is the equity fine unconstitutional? This Article will not develop
the full range of fanciful arguments that might be presented. 99 But a
simple rebuttal begins from the principle that the greater subsumes
the lesser. A common provision in many statutes authorizes the forfeiture of the corporate charter under certain general conditions conditions that a felony conviction probably satisifies. 100 If states
can revoke the charter, the equity fine is but a piecemeal substitute
that is far more modest and humane in its scope and effect. In addition, the "reserved power'' clause in most state corporation statutes
permits the state to impose additional conditions retroactively on the
grant of a corporation charter. 101 The equity fine would be a reasonable exercise of this power. 102
Finally, is an equity fine unprecedented and unthinkable? In a
narrow sense, it lacks clear precedent, but civil litigation against cash
intrinsic values of the corporations so traded tend to rely on competition among such analysts
as the means by which efficiency is obtained. Compare Murphy, Efficient Markets, Index
Funds, Illusion and Reality, J. PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, Fall 1977, at 5 (securities analyst can
outperform even efficient market), with Note, 17ze Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, Economic 17zeory and the Regulation efthe Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977). q.
J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARK.ET 70-110 (1973) (discussing role of securities
analyst in an efficient market).
99. Undoubtedly, some will argue that such a sanction violates the principle enunciated in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), that a private
corporation charter is protected against subsequent adverse legislative amendment by the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contractual obligation. Such arguments, of
course, overlook Justice Story's concurring opinion in this case in which he suggested that the
impairment clause would pose no obstacle if the state reserved a power authorizing such retroactive amendments at the time it granted the charter. States have uniformly followed Justice
Story's suggestion, and a reserved power is now a ubiquitous feature of state corporation
codes. See note 101 infra.
100. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.04 (Tent. Draft 1962); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1801
(Deering 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 283; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§§ 1101-1103, 1111(6)
(McKinney 1963). These statutes codify the ancient writ of quo warranto. See generally Note,
Corporations: Quo Warranto: Foifeiture efFranchise on Account ef Crime, 13 CORNELL L.Q.
92 (1927).
101. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 142 (1953).
102. In reality, the equity fine is likely to be a less draconian penalty than the remedy of
divestiture now available with respect to antitrust offenses. This divestiture sanction not infrequently falls on innocent shareholders. See Adams, Trustbusting and the 'Innocent' Shareholder: 'Compensation' -!f Stock Prices Fall?, 10 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 51 (1978).
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starved defendant corporations is often settled in return for the issuance of shares. In the case of the corporation, there is little reason to
distinguish the civil and criminal suits, since there is no real difference in the sanctions they can trigger. Moreover, other sanctions recently imposed on corporations have many of the same
characteristics as the equity fine (except that they are inferior substitutes). In a much publicized case, the Federal Communications
Commission ruled this year that because General Tire and Rub1Jer
Company had engaged in various forms of misconduct, including
illegal political payments, its subsidiary was unfit to hold three profitable television franchises it had long operated in New York, Boston, and Los Angeles. 103 In response, the subsidiary has attempted
to spin off its remaining radio and television properties. 104 One
could question the logic of the FCC's decision, but, stripped of its
rhetoric, General Tire has been sanctioned by the loss of valuable
properties. Such a compelled spin-off might eventually leave shareholders holding substantially equivalent, though subdivided, investments, but the result seems far less direct, more overbroad, and
clearly more likely to create externalities than the equity fine. Other
examples of novel corporate penalties that courts have recently imposed could also be cited: disqualifications from government contracts, loss of subsidies, denial of licenses, etc. 105 The trend is visible.
But the time has come to urge that the law adopt a rational strategy
in lieu of the unplanned, semi-conscious evolution that is now taking
place.
B. The Hester Prynne Sanction: Using Adverse Publicity to
Trigger Internal Reform

As Hester Prynne knew, public stigmatization can be a powerful
sanction. Although we cannot hang a scarlet letter on the corpora, tion, the criminal process has a unique theatricality which can con103. See RKO's Unfolding Spinoff Efforts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1980, § 4, at I, col. 3.
104. Id. To date, the Commission has rejected this spin-off proposal.
105. In theory, these penalties are being imposed by government agencies to sanction corporations for violations of that agency's regulations. Thus, in the RKO case the license forfeiture was justified by the FCC on the ground that the parent corporation had misrepresented
material facts to the agency about the operation of its subsidiary. While the sanction may have
been adequate in size to deter, however, there is little certainty as to when it will be invoked,
and, if invoked, whether it will be sustained by the courts. In addition, there is a possibility
that an externality may be visited upon the public (for example, if the RKO license were
transferred to an inferior broadcaster). For recent examples of this eclectic trend, see Federal
Contracts .Denied Firestone Over JJias .Dispute, Wash. Post, July 16, 1980, at D7, col. 5; Caesars
.Drops Top Executives and Gets Jersey License, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1980, § I, at 45, col. I;
Head ofFirm Quits After Charge, Wash. Post, July 9, 1980, at E7, col. 2 (reporting resignation
of chief executive incident to settlement of SEC civil complaint).
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vey public censure far more effectively than the civil-law process. 106
Recent research also suggests that the threat of stigmatization may
be the primary deterrent in the case of middle-class defendants. 107
But can we focus adverse publicity with similar efficacy when it is
the corporation that is convicted? If we can, adverse publicity might
seem an optimal penalty for corporate misbehavior, because it seems
to minimize the externalities associated with other forms of corporate punishment.
Little doubt exists that corporations dislike adverse publicity and
that unfavorable publicity emanating from an administrative or judicial source has considerable credibility. From this starting point,
commentators have suggested a variety of formal publicity sanctions;
for example, Professor Brent Fisse has recommended that the government publish a "corporation journal" which would detail the offenses of convicted organizations. 108 There is a danger, however,
that in practice such well-meaning reforms would become so
bureaucratized and pedestrian as to have only a negligible impact.
A cool-headed appraisal of the limits on adverse publicity as an effective legal sanction for organizations seems necessary. Such an appraisal will serve as a prelude for this Article's suggestion that the
focus of adverse publicity as an organizational penalty should be
shifted from the corporate entity to the individuals within the firm.
Such an approach again harnesses internal forces within the firm so
as to reduce the incongruence between the interests of managers and
their firm.
A strategy that seeks to deter corporations through adverse publicity aimed at the firm may fail because of the following problems:
First, the government is a relatively poor propagandist. It has
trouble being persuasive; rarely is it pithy; never can it speak in the
catchy slogans with which Madison A venue mesmerizes us. At its
best, the government sounds like the back pages of the New York
Times ("good, gray and dull"); at its worst, its idea of communica106. It should not be forgotten that only criminal cases carry captions such as "United
States of America v...." or People of the State of New York v...." There is what might be
termed a "Greek Chorus" effect to the jury's finding in a criminal case.
107. Nagin & Blumstein, supra note 12. Although this study focused on draft evaders, its
authors expressed a view that their findings might apply to middle-class offenders generally.
Id. at 269-70. Indeed, the business executive as criminal may have much in co=on with the
draft evader because both tend to see themselves as the innocent victims of government harassment.
108. Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against Business Corporations, 8
MELB. U. L. REV. 107 (1971). See also M. CLINARD, P. YEAGER, J. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHEK
& E. HARRIES, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 222-24 (1979); Gellhom,Adverse Publicity By
Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1380 (1973).
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tion is exemplified by the Federal Register. This soporific quality of
governmental prose matters little when it is addressed (as it usually
is) to lobbyists, bureaucrats and lawyers. · But to be effective, a publicity sanction must make the public pay attention. Those who have
had success in reaching the public - e.g. , the television networks
and the advertising agencies - recognize H.L. Mencken's maxim as
an iron law: No one ever lost money underestimating the intelligence of the American public. Such insight may have made Freddie
Silverman famous, but in this context it raises an ethical dilemma:
publicity requires over-simplification. The message must be simple
and catchy - even if a price must be paid in terms of its accuracy.
But this price is troubling; it seems indecent for the government to
engage directly in so dubious an endeavor as attempting to persuade
in the manner of Madison A venue advertising agencies.
Second, government publicity may be drowned out because the communication channels ofour society are already inundated with criticism
of corporations. In the language of the communications theorist,
there is too much noise in the channels for any message to be heard
with clarity. Unkind words about corporations come from a multitude of sources today: Naderites, editorialists, television commentators, politicians facing election campaigns, etc. The result is that the
currency is being devalued. Weak criticism tends to rob accurate
censure of its expressive force. The criminal conviction of the corporation should be a unique event, but it loses its special force when
the public constantly receives an implicit message that all corporations are corrupt or amoral.
Third, corporations can dilute this sanction through counter-publicity. As recent Mobil Oil advertisements about the energy crisis
should remind us, the corporation can fight back - and effectively.
In addition, recent Supreme Court decisions upholding the corporation's first amendment right to comment on public issues cloud the
constitutional status of any attempt to restrict such corporate rebuttals.109 In sum, these first three factors require us at least to be tentative in any judgment about the effectiveness of governmental
publicity.
Fourth, the efficacy ofpublicity in cases involving consumerfraud or
jeopardy to the public safety does not imply that publicity will be
equally efective in dealing with "regulatory" crimes. The public responds with outrage when it learns it has been sold an unsafe prod109. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 100 S. Ct. 2343
(1980).
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uct, administered a dangerous drug, or exposed to a carcinogenic
environmental hazard, but its reaction may be far less intense when
the crime threatens no obvious injury. The muckrakers learned this
lesson to their dismay at the start of this century. While an Upton
Sinclair or an Ida Tarbell could arouse the public's indignation over
the contents of sausage, they were less successful at crystallizing public concern over institutional corruption. Aiming at America's brain,
they hit only its belly. To be sure, the recent history of the Watergate scandals and particularly of the illegal corporate payments
scandals may lead us to temper this conclusion. The public did show
considerable interest in the details of the Lockheed, Gulf Oil and
United Brands scandals. But novelty wears off, and companies
which subsequently disclosed illegal payments at least as extensive
received far less public attention. 110 In any event, there is little evidence that either the public or investors changed their behavior because of these disclosures in any way which prejudiced these
corporations. Consumers did not shun Gulf gasoline or United
Brands bananas as a result of illegal payments publicity. Those who
did suffer were largely producers of capital equipment - such as
Lockheed and Northrup -who lost prospective sales to foreign governmental purchasers. Only in these cases did publicity not directly
aimed at the quality of the defendant's product produce financial
injury to the corporation.lll But this observation leads to still another, more general problem with publicity as a sanction:
F!fth, !fpublicity directed against the corporation is e.ffective, it will
produce the same externalities as cash fines. Adverse publicity is

something of a loose cannon; its exact impact cannot be reliably estimated nor is it controllable so that only the guilty are affected. Here,
the recent Ford Pinto case supplies a paradigm: although acquitted,
Ford's ability to market the Pinto has obviously been impaired. The
impact of reduced sales or the termination of a product line once
110. Exxon received far less attention, for example, than Lockheed, yet its acknowledged
political payments reached "nearly $60 million." See generally Political Slush Fund Hid Other
Spending, Cost Exxon Millions, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1975, at I, col. 6.
11 I. Both federal prosecutors and defense counsel have indicated to me that there is one
important exception to this generalization: a conviction under the "RICO" statute, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1976), would represent a "public relations disaster" for a public corporation
because stockholders would not understand that no connection with organized crime was necessary in order for the corporation to have engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity." As
a result, the prosecutor today gains substantial plea bargaining leverage by indicting a corporation on a "RICO" charge since he can drop this stigmatizing charge in return for a plea of
guilty to an equally broad but less sensational offense such as mail fraud. The leverage that
the "RICO" charge gives may, however, be short-lived: if too often used by the prosecutor, the
public would come to understand the overbroad nature of the statute, and hence its potential
public relations impact would be lost.
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again falls disproportionately on workers at the bottom of the hierarchy. If we are willing to bear these costs (as sometimes we must), it
seems easier to rely on even cash fines in preference to the wholly
unpredictable impact of a legal stigma. By no means is this argument a rejection of governmentally mandated publicity as a means
of correcting false advertising or of alerting the consumer to potential dangers. But the civil law can also achieve these goals and with
less effort and greater precision. Through product recalls, civil orders requiring corrective advertising, and even notices from the producer asking customers to desist from further use of the product,
administrative agencies can and have used publicity to protect the
consumer. 112 Here the end result is achieved without the extraneous
emotion and complexity that follows from attempting to use publicity itself as a form of punishment.
Finally, civil liberties issues surround the use ofpublicity as a sanction .113 The criminal process inherently involves adverse publicity,
and, to this extent, some element of the punishment precedes the
conviction. Publicity begins with the indictment, and an acquittal
does not fully undo the damage. In contrast, the quieter, less public
character of civil-law adjudication allows us to withhold the impact
of adverse publicity until there has been a finding.
Although a corporate defendant may be required to give notice
of its conviction to victims, more serious problems emerge when the
government itself seeks to broadcast the significance of the conviction outside the courtroom. In the frequent case where the defendant plea bargains and the government in return drops some of the
charges in the indictment, it would seem improper for the government to discuss unproved and unadmitted allegations in its publicity
efforts. 114 Such an attempt would implicitly violate the plea bargain
and would involve the government in possibly unconstitutional
112. The FTC's order requiring corrective advertising by Listerine is, of course, the most
celebrated example of such a power being put to sensible use. See Warner-Lambert Co., 86
FTC 1398 (1975), ajfd sub. nom. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). More recent examples would include the corrective advertising required of Proctor and Gamble, the manufacturer of a brand of tampons responsible for
toxic shock syndrome.
I 13. Former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel has criticized the SEC's use of public
reports under Section 2l(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on this ground, arguing that
such reports involve unreviewable stigmatization. However, the criminal process seems a safer
context for the use of such a power since a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will
precede any such report.
114. Due process oflaw requires that the government honor its plea agreements. See, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). It would seem to infringe on the government's
promise if the prosecutor were to continue to assert publicly the defendant's guilt on charges
the prosecutor agreed to drop.
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forms of stigmatization. Similar problems arise where officially prepared publicity describing the corporation's conduct alleges misbehavior by unindicted corporate officials. Restraint seems necessary
'in these circumstances, but it is likely to give a fragmentary, disjointed character to governmental efforts at publicity.
These considerations might lead one to reject the use of publicity
as a formal criminal penalty for organizations. But this would be an
overreaction. Most of the foregoing problems arise from the attempt
to direct publicity against the corporation as an entity. Stigmatizing
a legal fiction is both difficult (because the consumer cares about the
product, not the producer) and dangerous (because of the overspill
problem and the uncontrollable character of the penalty). However,
there remains the possibility that the focal point of adverse publicity
can be shifted from the entity to the individual officer. Of course,
this automatically occurs when we prosecute the individual, but it
seldom happens when the prosecutor takes the easier course and
pursues the corporation. us
What then can the court sensitive to civil liberties do at sentencing to refocus public censure from the firm to the responsible individuals? Two possibilities exist under conventional sentencing law.
First, the court typically receives a presentence report from the probation office before imposing sentence. 116 Typically, a probation officer interviews the offender and examines the prosecutor's files. In
the corporate context this appears an exercise without a purpose,
since the normal probation officer is ill-equiped to study the corporation. But, the court might appoint and compensate a special probation officerll 7 - a distinguished local lawyer, a business school
professor or an experienced corporate director - who could study
the corporate offender on a necessarily enlarged scale. He would interview corporate officers and, perhaps, the corporation's attorneys,
in order to determine more fully the context and causes of the crime.
Because the corporation is not itself entitled to claim the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 118 corporate officials could refuse to answer a probation officer's questions only if 115. See generally JJevelopments in the Law - Corporate Crime, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227,
1243-45 (1979) [hereinafter cited as JJevelopments in the Law].
116. 3 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 91, at Ch. 18-5.1 (2d ed. 1980) (setting forth expected
contents of such a report) (the author of this Article served as reporter for chapter 18 of these
standards).
117. The Federal Criminal Code expressly grants this authority. See S. 1722, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3802 (1979).
I 18. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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they themselves claimed the privilege in their own right. Not only
would this be difficult for most executives to do, but, under existing
law, they would still have no right to refuse to provide corporate
books and records in response to a subpoena, even if such corporate
records incriminate them. Under Supreme Court decisions, the corporation's property right to the records has decisive significance. 119
In addition, it has traditionally been a sentencing factor to consider
whether the defendant "cooperated" with the authorities. This principle has been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. 120 As a
result, the offender corporation which resists a presentence inquiry
might subject itself to enhanced penalties.
Thus, a financially sophisticated probation officer armed with a
subpoena power can probably obtain access to virtually all corporate
information and records bearing on the crime, with only the attorney's work product standing as a probable exception. What should
such an officer attempt to achieve? An appropriate model might be
the careful study prepared for Gulf Oil by John J. McCloy, its special counsel, which detailed in specific and unemotional terms the
extent of the internal falsification and deliberate deception of the
Gulf board by senior Gulf management. That deception fostered
Gulf's extensive program of domestic and foreign political payments.121 The impact of the McCloy Report on the Gulf board was
immediate and substantial; it triggered internal reforms within Gulf
and hastened the resignation of some apparently culpable senior officials.122
Equally important, the McCloy study, although written in dry
and hyper-precise tones, was picked up by the media. It was republished by the popular press, and it became a paperback bestseller. 123
119. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973); Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,381
(1911).
120. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980) (sentencing court may properly consider

as a factor in deciding to impose consecutive sentences that defendant refused to cooperate
with government officials investigating a related criminal conspiracy). Although Roberts recognized that a fear ofphysical reprisal or the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege could
justify noncooperation and prevent its use as a sentencing factor, the corporation lacks the
privilege against self-incrimination (see note 118 supra) and cannot be physically retaliated
against; thus, the use of noncooperation as an adverse sentencing factor seems much less troublesome in its case. For a fuller discussion of Roberts, see Coffee, "Twisting Slowly In the
Wind:" A Search for Constitutional Limits on Coercion ofthe Criminal J)efendanl, 1980 SUP.
CT. REV. - - - - (forthcoming).
121. See Board ofDirectors of Gulf Oil Corp., Report of the Special Review Committee of
the Board of Directors of Gulf Oil Corporation (1975).
122. See Robertson, The J)ireclors Woke lip Too Late al Guff, FORTUNE, June 1976, at
121.
123. J. McCLOY, THE GREAT OIL SPILL (1976) (paperback edition of Gulf Oil Report).
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Undoubtedly, it also supplied the raw material for other more journalistic treatments of the same topic. Clearly, this theme of intrigue
among senior corporate management has a certain fascination for a
substantial public audience. To be sure, this audience will still buy
gasoline from Gulf, but economic injury to Gulf is neither necessary
nor desirable once the censure is shifted onto the individual.
The suggestion, then, is that the presentence report on corporate
offenders be prepared in considerable factual depth in the expectation that such studies will either find an audience in their own right
or, more typically, provide the source material for investigative journalism. This approach permits the government both to avoid the
ethical dilemma of itself being a publicist, and to rely on the more
effective public communication skills of the professional journalist.
In a sense, this approach integrates public and private enforcement.
The proposal faces a serious barrier, however, in the traditional
(but not uniform) rule that the presentence report is a confidential
document not available for public inspection. 124 Overbroad as the
notion of corporate privacy is in this context, techniques for evading
this obstacle seem obvious: for example, the SEC might routinely
request that such presentence reports be prepared on all publicly
held corporate offenders. SEC files will then eventually become
available for public inspection under the Freedom of Information
Act. 125 The SEC could also require disclosure of substantially
equivalent data in the corporation's next proxy statement. 126
A second approach would outflank all problems of confidentiality. The same report could be prepared not as part of a presentence
investigation but as a mandated study imposed as a condition of pro124. See 3 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 91, at Standard 18-5.3 (2d ed. 1980) ("The
presentence report should not be a public record"). As explained therein, however, the
presentence report is today a public record in some jurisdictions, including California and
Virginia.
125. The SEC's procedures regarding disclosure of confidential information under the
Freedom of Information Act have been revised in the wake of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281 (1979). See Securities Act Release No. 6172 (Dec. 28, 1979), 45 Fed. Reg. 62421 (Jan.
8, 1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 200.83). q. Pitt, Procedures to Limit Third-Party JJisclosure, Natl. L.J., Jan. 22, 1979, at 25, col. l (explaining steps an attorney can take to limit SEC
disclosure of information about client). Nonetheless, although the "reverse FOIA" lawsuit has
been successful in preventing agency disclosure of trade secrets under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 Supp. I & Supp. III 1979)), the concept of "trade secret"
should not be stretched so far as to cover a study by a probation officer of illegal behavior.
Such information is neither of a proprietary character nor is it "secret," since the agency receives the information from an outside source, rather than from the corporation.
126. See cases cited at note 75 supra (requiring disclosure in proxy statement of management improprieties).
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bation. 127 Such a condition of probation seems reasonably related to
the goal of crime prevention and thus could be sustained. 128 Several
problems now seem simplified: (1) because the counsel preparing
the report is at least in theory the corporation's own counsel (that is,
the report will be prepared by special counsel chosen by the corporation but with the court's approval), the attorney-client privilege question is reduced in significance; (2) the conditions of probation could
reasonably require dissemination of the report to stockholders (and
hence, as a practical matter, to the world generally); and (3) the corporation's response to the report could be legitimately considered by
the court in determining how long to continue the period of probation.129 In effect, this last factor creates an incentive for internal reforms and discipline of culpable officials.
By either route - probation condition or presentence report the sentencing court should draw upon the recent SEC experience
with illegal payments cases. In response to the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program (which promised preferred treatment for those corporations which voluntarily reported their questionable payments),
hundreds of public corporations conducted elaborate investigations,
and the corporate self-scrutiny report developed both as a distinctive
genre and as a field of legal practice. 130 One critical generalization
stands out from this experience: the adequacy, and indeed integrity,
of the self-study report depends above all on the independence of the
special counsel conducting it. Dispassionate observers have noticed
a major difference between studies conducted by the corporation's
own counsel and those undertaken by an independent special counsel (selected in some instances with judicial or agency participation).131 An investigation by the corporation's own counsel is likely
127. For a discussion ofjudicial authority to sentence a corporation to probation, see Note,
supra note 8, and notes 169-73 i,!fra and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of the "reasonableness" requirement, see 3 ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 91, at Standard 18-2.3(e) (2d ed. 1980); MODEL PENAL CODE, § 301.2(1)(1) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962); see also Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 61 CoLUM. L.
REV. 181 (1967).
129. This same position is taken by the pending Senate bill to recodify the Federal Criminal Code, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), with respect to fines imposed on organizations.
Section 2202(a)(4) requires the court, in determining the size of the fine, to consider in the case
of organizations "any measure taken by the organization to discipline its employees or agents
responsible for the offense or to insure against a recurrence of such an offense." The Committee Report to the companion House Bill (H.R. 6915, H.R. REP. No. 96-1396, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 467 (1980)), takes a similar position. See note 161 i,!fra. The court might also consider
these same factors in determining how long to continue the period of probation.
130. For overviews, see Coffee, supra note 38, at 1115-27; Herlihy & Levin, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW & POL. INTL. Bus. 547 (1976).
131. See Demott, Reweaving the Corporate Veil· Management Structure and the Control of
Corporate Information, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 189, 215-17 (Summer 1977).
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to be far less probing.
This adverse publicity proposal has two essential premises, one
procedural and one substantive. The procedural premise is a conservative one: what the government cannot do well itself, it should
leave to the marketplace and private enterprise. Because it is neither
likely nor desirable that a government would be a successful propagandist, government should attempt instead to encourage private initiatives. Mandated self-study reports would provide just such
encouragement.
But what does adverse publicity accomplish where the corporation is not financially injured by the disclosures? Here we come to
the substantive premise: publicity as a sanction can serve to reduce
the incongruence between the interests of the manager and the firm,
and it can do so in an extremely cost-effective manner. In general, it
is difficult to identify culpable individuals with sufficient assurance
to convict them (particularly in the face of judicial and jury empathy
for middle-class defendants). Thus, a publicity sanction which identifies the responsible individuals after the corporate entity is convicted may in many instances be the only available way to censure
the culpable manager. This publicity imposes costs on the culpable
manager on three distinct levels: first, the manager suffers a loss of
public- and self-respect, which some research suggests is the most
potent deterrent for the middle-class potential offender. Second, adverse publicity substantially reduces the official's chances for promotion within the firm. Competition for advancement is keen within
almost all firms, and competitors of the culpable official can be relied
upon to use adverse publicity about their rival to their own advantage. SEC proxy disclosure requirements may pose a further barrier
to such an official's advancement. Finally, disclosure of the identity
of the culpable official also invites a derivative suit by which any
costs visited on the firm can be shifted (at least in part) to the individual. Here again, private enforcement is desirably integrated with
public enforcement through the linking mechanism of disclosure.
A final virtue of this approach should also be recognized. Because courts and }egislatures find vicarious criminal liability ethically troubling, the negligent official faces little threat that he will be the
target of a criminal prosecution, even where his actions or inactions
are a proximate cause of the corporation's offense. Similarly, the supervising official who "looks the other way" and tolerates misconduct by his subordinates is likely to be immune from the civil law's
reach. Both, however, are within the reach of a publicity sanction.
The mandated corporate self-study can focus both on active miscon-
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duct and on the passive negligence of senior officials. The empirical
evidence suggests that even an entrenched senior executive becomes
vulnerable to ouster once there has been sufficient adverse publicity
about him that his continued presence embarrasses the firm. 132 Once
a serious internal corporate investigation is begun, few, if any, corporate officials are immune.
Earlier it was suggested that corporate pressure on the middle
manager may make the remote risk of criminal prosecution seem less
serious to him than the "clear and present" danger of dismissal if he
fails to achieve targeted goals. However, publicity may create a
countervailing force: the knowledge that a corporate conviction
would lead to a judicially mandated, independently conducted internal audit - which would assess the performance of upper-echelon
supervisors in addition to those directly involved in the crime might do much to overcome the sometimes extreme pressure under
which middle managers today function.
C. Integrating Public-a!!._d Private Enforcement: A Reexamination
of the Private Attorney General

Nullification of criminal penalties may be a fact of life which,
like death and taxes, simply must be accepted. Whether this phenomenon is premised on a fear of the adverse social consequences
from penalties imposed on the corporation, or whether courts are
simply unwilling to impose high penalties which do not compensate
the victims of the offense, nullification is an obstacle to adequate deterrence which intelligent policy planning must find a way to circumvent. But one exception to this problem clearly exists: while courts
are reluctant to impose high penalties to punish or deter, they toler132. The chief executive officers of Gulf and Lockheed were forced to resign in the wake of
illegal payments disclosures, and the chief executive officer of Northrop was required to relinquish one of his executive positions. See generally Robertson, supra note 122; see also Clearing
Payojf" Storm, Northrop Chief Keeps Firm Hand on Controls, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1976, at I,
col. 6; Barmash, Heads Rolling in the Board Room, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, § 3, at I, col. 3,
Nevertheless, some high executive officers of several corporations have recently been retained
in office notwithstanding a felony conviction. See Nathan, Coddled Criminals, HARPER'S, Jan.
1980, at 30; Watergate .Donors Still Riding High, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1975, § 3, at I, col. I;
Loving, How Bob Rowen Served His Time, FORTUNE, Aug. 27, 1979, at 42, 44. In still other
cases, the SEC has apparently required the resignation of a chief executive officer as a condition of a civil settlement. See Company, CEO Charged With Self .Dealing, Consent lo Govem•
once Reforms, Injunction, SEC. REG. & L. REP., BNA, July 16, 1980, at A-7 (chief executive
officer agrees to resign and to "not become an officer or director of a public company without
approval of the court"). Thus, although the evidence is mixed, instances are clear in which the
disclosure has triggered either internal reforms or SEC imposed disqualification. The critical
variable may be how embarrassed the corporation becomes at the retention of culpable officer,
and this variable can be influenced by the mandated self-study here recommended.
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ate enormous damages awards to compensate victims. 133 For example, in the famous electrical equipment conspiracy of the 1950s, the
largest single fine (levied on General Electric) was $437,500, but approximately $600 million was paid by the defendants to settle private
litigation. 134 Comparable, but lower amounts have been paid already in more recent and still unresolved price fixing cases. 135
At the risk then of seeming to rediscover the wheel, it is best to
start our appraisal of private enforcement by noting that it offers two
distinct advantages: (1) private enforcers are able to raise the total
penalties exacted from the corporation to a level well in excess of
those which either the criminal law or public enforcement generally
can levy, and (2) by acting as "private attorneys general," civil plaintiffs multiply society's enforcement resources and thereby increase
the probability of detection. This latter theme has been much emphasized, and the private antitrust plaintiff's ability to discover conspiracies and violations which have escaped the attention of public
enforcers is frequently glorified as the great virtue of private enforcement. But here, a heretical observation is unavoidable: recent experience confirms the first assertion that private enforcement raises the
penalty for illegal activity, but it provides very little evidence to corroborate the second proposition. Indeed, in the antitrust context, the
current pattern is almost the reverse of the theory: the private plaintiff is typically a "free rider" who files his civil action in the wake of
an indictment brought by the Antitrust Division. 136 It is not uncommon today for the private enforcer to attend the criminal trial and to
take copious notes so that evidence uncovered by the government
will yield a treble damage recovery for him. In effect, the private
133. My premise is that to induce courts to impose sanctions that truly deter, the penalty
must also serve to compensate victims. This argument has recently been made by an_experienced antitrust attorney. See Dorman, The Casefor Compensation: Why Compensatory Components are Required far Efficient Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1117-18 (1980)
("Without the promise of compensation, there is little likelihood that a system of antitrust law
enforcement will efficiently deter violations"). Alternatively, civil actions may produce very
high settlements because defendants are risk-averse and agree to high settlements to avoid
even greater exposure at trial. This hypothesis is also consistent with empirical data since most
private antitrust actions end in settlement. However, either hypothesis produces the same policy prescription: it is private enforcement operating in the wake of public enforcement that
truly levies the sanction.
134. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note- 28, at 56-57 (as to fine paid by General
Electric); Wheeler,Antitrust Treb/e-.DamageActions: .Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319,
1336 n.78 (1973).
135. See Rudnitsky & Blyskal, supra note 16; see also text at notes 56-57 supra,
136. See Reich, The Antitrust Industry, 68 GEo. L.J. 1053, 1065 (1980) ("Plaintiffs' counsel
can increase their revenues . . . by depending upon the government to undertake 'test runs' of
liability in advance"). For examples of private plaintiffs following in the wake of a government investigation, see Rudnitsky & Blyskal, supra note 16, at 59, 62.
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enforcer reaps the benefit of the enforcement efforts by public enforcers. In such cases, the actual litigation undertaken by the private
enforcers is chiefly internecine: they skirmish among themselves
over such procedural issues as the appointment of lead counsel, the
size of the settlement, and the allocation of attorney's fees. Nor is
this pattern unique to antitrust cases. In the securities law field, it
has been observed that few cases of insider trading have been detected by private plaintiffs; rather, once again, the private plaintiff
rides the coattails of the SEC's enforcement staff. 13 7
Of course, this pattern is logical and predictable. Other things
being equal, rational plaintiffs' attorneys will naturally pursue those
cases where they can earn the highest recovery with the lowest investment of time and money. Since they receive the same benefit
regardless of whether they or the government detects the violation,
they will elect not to pursue their own cases independently when
they can ride cheaply on the government's coattails. The aggregate
result is a misallocation of resources since private enforcers, rather
than increase enforcement, simply battle over the carcass of the defendant which the government has gratuitously bestowed on them.
At first glance, the solution to this problem seems obvious: create
an incentive for the private enforcer to pursue his own cases by denying him a treble damage recovery where his action is filed in the
wake of the government's investigation.1 38 Such a proposal sensibly
encourages the private enforcer to concentrate on detecting violations not known to the government. But it has a basic drawback in
terms of the first proposition advanced in this section: it reduces the
capacity of private enforcement to elevate the penalty to a level
above that possible through the criminal law, and thus to offset (partially at least) the low risk of apprehension for many organizational
crimes. In short, if the virtue of private enforcement was its ability
137. In a study of insider trading cases, Professor Dooley found that ''virtually all private
enforcement efforts were based upon proceedings brought by the Commission." Hetherington,
supra note 95, at 228. Dooley found only five cases which have been initiated by private
parties without prior SEC action. Id. at 228 n.142.
138. Professor Kenneth Dam proposes that a public agency's commencement of an action
should cut off all private actions that are subsequently filed. See Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, .Detellence and Conflict ofInterest, 4 J. LEGAL Snm. 47, 68 (1975). In
effect, this prescription compels private enforcers to seek out new actions rather than ride the
government's coattails. However, this sacrifices the goal of victim compensation unless the
government is able to obtain restitution in its action. Also, from the perspective of this Article,
it may fail to generate adequate deterrence since the government's action may result in an
inadequate fine. Dam seems to recognize this point when he concedes that it is the treble
damage action "which is the principal deterrent to antitrust violations." Id. at 116. In principle, an adequately punitive fine might replace the treble damage action, but this has not occurred in practice, and some commentators have argued that courts will not punish adequately
unless they are pursuing a compensatory objective. See Dorman, supra note 133, at 1117-18,
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to exact higher penalties, we would sacrifice that virtue by awarding
compensatory damages rather than treble damages in private suits
preceded by a government investigation.
Thus, a solution is necessary which both gives the private enforcer an incentive to discover undetected crimes and encourages the
court to award multiple damages. Once the problem is so defined,
various answers are undoubtedly possible. One solution in private
antitrust cases might be to preserve treble damages, but, when the
government's action preceded the private suit, to require that only
one third of the damages go to the private plaintiff (i.e., the compensatory portion) and the remaining two thirds go to a state-run crime
victim compensation fund. This diversion of the recovery would still
leave the sentencing judge with a sense that he is compensating
"worthy" victims, rather than simply imposing punitive fines, but it
would also encourage the private plaintiff to pursue his own cases to
secure a higher recovery. An alternative route to this same end
would be to legislate restrictions on the portion of the recovery that
could be paid over to the attorney. Such legislation might sensibly
place a much lower ceiling on the maximum allowable attorney's fee
(including both those fees paid by the client out of the recovery and
those separately awarded by the court) in free-rider cases.
Before accepting the private multiple damages remedy as the best
means of outflanking the nullification problem, a serious policy appraisal must consider more than simply the need to encourage private litigants to pursue "new" cases rather than ride free on the
government's case. In particular, the following questions stand out:
(1) Is the class action an equally good substitute for a treble damages
remedy since it also gives the plaintiff's attorney an adequate incentive to invest time and money on a risky proposition?; (2) Is the danger of extortionate settlements and fabricated injuries so heightened
when we authorize the litigant to recover not only his own injuries,
but a multiple thereof, that deterrence comes at too high a price?;
and (3) If the typical loss caused by a generic type of crime exceeds
the expected gain, does this imbalance weaken the case for a multiple damages formula since compensatory damages offer adequate
deterrence? These questions require qualified answers.
First, although the class action may sometimes offer an acceptable alternative to the multiple damages action, often it will be an
inadequate one. Simply put, there may be too many issues which are
not common to all the members of the class for the class action device to be effective. For example, in a Ford Pinto-type case, if the
victims of all Pinto explosions were to pursue Ford in a civil class
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action, they might be able to obtain a decision that the design of the
Pinto gas tank was defective. But, there would remain a number of
issues which would necessarily be unique to each crash: proximate
cause, contributory negligence in the care and operation of the vehicle, damages, etc. As a result, the plaintiff's attorney would still face
a series of discrete individual litigations. Thus, the incentive provided by the class action form may not in all situations be an adequate substitute for the multiple damages formula.
An important generalization underlies this observation: in any
legal dispute, the plaintiff needs to prove a certain number of distinct
issues before he may recover. In a tort case, these typically include:
(1) the existence of a legal duty owed to him, (2) negligent behavior
by the defendant, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. The
higher the percentage of these predicate elements which can be
proved in a class action, the greater is the deterrent threat that civil
litigation poses to the defendant. In those cases where a high percentage may be so proved, the availability of the class action is probably a more important deterrent than the existence of a treble
damages recovery. But, both antitrust law and securities law are relatively unique in this regard because the critical issues can be established in the class action. - The same is also true in mass disaster cases
(e.g. , airplane crashes or possibly a nuclear accident). However, it is
clearly not as true in a Pinto-type case. Therefore, the argument for
legislating a multiple damages formula as a partial substitute for the
class action is strongest in these latter contexts.
The second question posed above was whether the pursuit of adequate deterrence through private enforcement comes at too high a
price. It may, because reliance on private enforcement may require
us to abandon the advantages of prosecutorial discretion. Economists in particular have emphasized this theme, claiming that a
"misinformation effect" results when a private party is offered a substantial reward for establishing that a violation of law has occurred.139 Put simply, the private plaintiff as bounty hunter may
misrepresent that a violation has occurred in order to claim the reward. Unlike the public enforcer, who has an interest in a rational
body of law, the private enforcer cares only for victory. To rephrase
Holmes, big bounties make bad law. This may be so both because
plaintiffs will seek to extend and distort the law and because courts
will predictably react by pulling back and partially nullifying such
139. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 28, at 90-95, 113-15, 152-53 (recommending
that optimal sanction is a fine without compensation to victims). But see Dorman, supra note
133, at 1117-18 (doubting that courts would impose such fines unless compensation results).

January 1981)

Corporate Punishment

439

statutes. This danger is obviously greatest when the law's command
is vague or when the offense is subject to fabrication by the purported victim. Rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Court appears to
have become convinced that private enforcement of the federal securities laws poses exactly this danger of "vexatious litigation"
brought chiefly to extort a settlement from a defendant who cannot
afford the risk of an adverse determination. 140
How should we respond to this problem without sacrificing the
private attorney general concept? We should start by distinguishing
those statutes whose uncertain perimeters make prosecutorial discretion essential from those that involve behavior patterns which are
less subject to fabrication. For example, a huge gulf here separates a
securities violation and a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy: the operative trigger for liability under the securities laws is the term "materiality" which necessarily has fuzzy edges; in contrast, the typical
fact pattern in a private horizontal price-fixing suit is a concrete activity - rigged bids or other unusual behavior - whose occurrence
the plaintiff cannot fabricate nearly as easily as he can claim deception because of the omission of some allegedly material fact. Similarly, toxic and environmental violations seem immune from this
danger, and may be sufficiently difficult to detect as to justify such an
incentive for private enforcement efforts.
Conversely, where the "misinformation effect" is perceived to be
a danger or where overenforcement otherwise seems possible, private plaintiffs should still be given a treble damage private cause of
action, but it should be preconditioned on either a prior criminal
conviction or a successful civil prosecution by a public enforcer for
the same wrongdoing. Alternatively, a "probable cause" determination could be made by a public enforcer as a necessary prelude. Absent such a conviction, determination, or probable cause finding, the
private plaintiff might still have a cause of action, but only for compensatory damages. In effect, the private plaintiff would "piggyback" on the public agency, which would exercise discretion in
determining the cases to be prosecuted. This integration of public
and private enforcement both preserves prosecutorial discretion and
uses private enforcement as a means of securing adequate deterrence. A statute which partially implements these principles is Section 909.4 of the Iowa Corrections Code, which gives "any person
140. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) ("There has
been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule l 0b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general"); see
generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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who has suffered loss" a treble damage action against a "corporation, partnership or other association" convicted of a felony or aggravated misdemeanor. 141 Although Iowa justifies this provision on
the ground that organizations cannot be incarcerated, its real effect is
to couple private enforcement as a caboose to the engine of public
enforcement. Its deficiency, however, is that the treble damage
formula focuses the private enforcer's energies on defendants who
have already been apprehended, and thus removes the incentive to
pursue the cases which public enforcement failed to detect. Conceivably, such a policy could be justified if one believed the danger of the
"misinformation effect" were equally pervasive across the board.
But this seems overbroad. Thus, the optimal statutory structure
should authorize a treble damages penalty in private suits following
government prosecution, but also supplement it with three other provisions:
(I) In private cases filed after an indictment, two thirds of the
punitive damages should go to some public fund rather than to the
private enforcer or, alternatively, the plaintiff's attorney's legal fees
should be restricted. The intent here is that the ceiling on the attorney's recovery be substantially below that obtainable in cases
brought prior to the commencement of the criminal action
(2) Private treble damage actions which precede a conviction
should also be authorized for those generic types of violations that
do not seem vulnerable to dissimulation by plaintiffs. Private attorneys recovery should not be limited here in order that there is a relatively greater incentive to pursue these "new" cases.
(3) Treble damage formulae are unnecessary where the damages caused by the crime vastly exceed the likely corporate gain from
the crime, unless such damages could not be obtained through a class
action and are too modest on an individual plaintiff basis to justify
litigation.
No statutory structure can incorporate all these principles in
ideal form, but as guidelines for the redesign of legislative codes,
these principles outline a compromise under which deterrence can be
increased without also enhancing the risk of "misinformation" or
sacrificing prosecutorial discretion.

D. Corporate Plea Bargaining
An unnoticed advantage follows from the form of the Iowa stat141. IowA CODE ANN. § 909.4 (West 1979). ("Treble damage liability for corporations,
partnerships and associations").
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ute that authorizes a private treble damages action following a corporate conviction: it makes possible a new form of plea bargaining
that could have special utility in this context of corporate crime and
could reduce the overspill of corporate penalties even if we continue
to rely on c~sh fines. Essentially, such a statute gives enormous significance to the plea of nolo contendere and its collateral estoppel
effects. 142 To understand when such a plea should be accepted requires that we restate some policy assumptions.
For deterrence to work, the threat must be credible, but the sanctions need not be invariably imposed. The threat of a private damages penalty is credible because the corporate defendant knows full
well that private plaintiffs will pursue their own self-interest if it is
easy for them to do so. But given the existence of a credible deterrent, the windfall treble damages recovery, it does not follow automatically that the private plaintiff should be entitled to a windfall, if
instead the public enforcer can bargain the treble recovery away for
his own legitimate ends. Assuming that the consequences of the
court's acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere is to deny collateral
estoppel effect to the conviction, the public enforcer has the ability to
short-circuit private enforcement if the defendant will plead guilty
and otherwise cooperaty with the prosecution. Many may shrink
from this suggestion because of the repugnant results plea-bargaining has tended to produce in the context of individual defendants.
Yet, it would be another example of a sentimental anthropomorphism infecting our policy toward corporate behavior if we were to
reject plea-bargaining with organizational defendants on such
grounds.
The nolo plea has today fallen into disfavor - and understandably so. Rule ll(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now
requires the court to hear the views of the prosecutor before accepting a nolo plea, 143 and the Department of Justice's formal policy
today is to resist such a plea, absent special approval from senior
officials of the department. 144 Although the federal courts tend still
to ignore this position in antitrust cases, nolo pleas are infrequently
142. See generally Hayden, The Plea of Noto Contendere, 25 Mo. L. REV. 227 (1965); A.
VESTAL, RES JUDlCATA/PRECLUSlON at V-386-88 (1969).
143. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b).
144. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION
(1980) reprinted in 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3277, 3286 (1980). ("Federal prosecutors should
henceforth oppose the acceptance of a nolo plea, unless the responsible Assistant Attorney
General concludes that the circumstances are so unusual that acceptance of the plea would be
in the public interest").
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accepted in other cases. 145 Yet when the government prosecutes a
corporate defendant, plea bargaining over a nolo plea may make
sense, since corporate prosecutions are costly to the state and there is
little need for incapacitation.
In short, the nolo plea should be the subject of bargaining between the prosecutor and counsel for the corporate defendant. What
might the prosecutor sensibly bargain for? Prime candidates would
include the following: (1) restitution to injured victims (in effect, the
injured party would receive compensation through the criminal process, but not treble damages); (2) preventive auditing and monitoring
controls (which could be imposed as a condition of probation); (3)
resolution of pending civil litigation (thus reducing judicial delay
and unburdening the courts); and (4) a suspended fine (which might
be used to backstop the conditions of probation).
In this light, the private enforcer becomes a bludgeon with which
the prosecutor can threaten the defendant. To be sure, the acceptance of the nolo plea would not prevent subsequent private litigation, but it could change the odds by denying any collateral estoppel
effect to the criminal conviction. This integration of private and
public enforcement would require statutory clarification of the collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction. The need for clarification of the collateral estoppel effect may seem surprising since it is
the conventional wisdom among lawyers that a criminal conviction
does indeed have the collateral effect of conclusively establishing the
facts alleged in all counts in the indictment which resulted in conviction. Curiously, however, this is not the law in most states. As Professor Vestal has demonstrated, a third party plaintiff is today clearly
entitled to use the criminal conviction in only a minority of jurisdictions in order to deny the defendant the opportunity to relitigate
civilly the issues on which he was criminally convicted. 146 Tradi145. For an example of a case where a nolo plea was accepted, see, e.g., Patterson v.
Stovall, 528 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976) (companion civil case to criminal case in which federal
prosecutor approved plea of nolo contendere in return for restitution by defendant to civil
plaintiffs). I have been informed also by a defense counsel that in the criminal prosecution of
Schlitz Brewing Company for illegal payments, a nolo plea was accepted because a plea of
guilty might have required the automatic forfeiture of various liquor licenses.
146. See A. VESTAL, supra note 142, at ch. 12. Professor Vestal found only a few decisions
permitting a third party to claim that the defendant was collaterally estopped by the conviction: Palma v. Powers, 395 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Newman v. Larson, 225 Cal. App. 2d
22, 36 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1964); Teitelbaum Furs v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d
439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962); Pennsylvania Turnpike Commn. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar., 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d 423 (1965). Although he found that the number of these cases
had increased in a more recent examination, difficult problems remain, particularly where the
victim wishes to sue in a jurisdiction different from that of the criminal conviction. See Vestal,
Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 loWA L. REV. 281, 321-37 (1980).
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tionally, the doctrine of mutuality barred offensive use of the criminal conviction to estop the defendant: either both parties were
bound or neither was bound, and clearly the civil plaintiff could not
be estopped by the defendant's acquittal in the criminal case (where
the plaintiff was not a party and where a higher standard of proof
applied). 147 But the Restatement (Second) of Judgments has abandoned this doctrine, 148 and the Supreme Court laid it to final rest in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore . 149 In the wake of Parklane, which
permitted a civil plaintiff to make offensive use of a prior civil judgment obtained by a government agency, there is little reason to deny
the same collateral effect to a prior criminal conviction. Statutory
reform is, however, important because of one aspect of Parklane:
the decision substitutes in place of the old mutuality doctrine the
requirement that the defendant have a sufficient incentive to litigate
"fully and vigorously" in the first action. 150 The Supreme Court recognized that this incentive may not exist where the defendant faced
only nominal damages in the first action. This test calls into question the present sufficiency of the incentive to defend in criminal
cases where the authorized fine is low (in particular, it makes it very
questionable whether a collateral estoppel effect could be given to a
misdemeanor conviction).
A statutory answer is desirable because the problem is circular.
If the collateral estoppel effect of a felony conviction were established by statute, the defendant would have notice of the possible
loss and would thereby be given, in Park!ane's terms, "every incentive to litigate ... fully and vigorously." 151 Once the criminal conviction is given such an effect, the absence of collateral estoppel
147. For a full discussion of the mutuality doctrine and the injustices it could cause, see
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 322-27
(1971). See also Semmel, Co!!ateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder ofParties, 68 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1457 (1968). In addition, the unfortunately narrow rule has evolved in some jurisdictions
that a criminal conviction will collaterally estop the defendant in subsequent civil litigation
only where such litigation concerns an attempt by the defendant to retain or enjoy the proceeds of the illegal conduct. See generally 46 AM. JuR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 618 (1969 & Supp.
1979). But see note 149 i,ifra.
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 88 (fent. Draft No. 2, 1975) (giving broad
discretion to court to determine whether "offensive" issue preclusion should result). The Restatement of Judgments does _not, however, address the effect of a criminal conviction.
149. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). While Parklane gave collateral effect to a prior civil proceeding
(rather than a criminal conviction), several decisions have now approved issue preclusion because of a prior criminal conviction. See Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 160 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974); Cardillo
v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1973).
150. On the theme of "incentive to litigate," see also A. VESTAL, supra note 142, at V-350-

51.
151. 439 U.S. at 332.
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following a nolo plea makes plea bargaining attractive. Interestingly, another simplification becomes possible: the same court could
probably hear both the criminal case and the subsequent civil cases.
Such consolidation might arguably be unfair if the law forbids the
offensive use of collateral estoppel, but less so if the law favors it. In
short, existing practices under the Multi-District Litigation Manual
could be carried one step further: both civil and criminal cases could
be consolidated before the same judge, and the criminal case tried
first.1s2
To sum up, such a structure simplifies the prosecutor's task. He
would have a powerful new weapon that could be used to speed restitution to victims. It also would involve less drastic penalties than
would often be imposed if the prosecutor and the defendant were
forced to fight an "all or nothing" battle for the benefit of the civil
plaintiffs waiting in the wings. To be sure, the power thereby given
to the prosecutor is potentially frightening, but some evidence exists
that equally frightening powers now reside in the less accountable
hands of the plaintiffs' attorney.
E.

Corporate Criminal Responsibility: A Pragmatic Reassessment

Few criminal law issues have evoked as divided a response from
W estem legal systems as the issue of whether the corporation should
be held criminally responsible. Civil law countries have rejected the
idea of corporate criminal responsibility on the ground that the corporation lacks the requisite mens rea to commit a crime. 153 In contrast, the federal rule within the United States has been that of
respondeat superior: crimes committed by an agent, within the scope
of his authority, in order to benefit the corporation create criminal
liability for the corporation. 154 The Model Penal Code takes still a
152. To be sure, such a scheme arguably retains an element of unfairness since the criminal court judge may be predisposed to grant offensive collateral effect to the conviction in the
subsequent civil action, even though Parklane assumes this decision will be a discretionary
one. However, there is little difference between empowering the same judge to hear all civil
actions growing out of the same transaction as the criminal conviction and authorizing him, as
a matter of sentencing discretion, to impose a sentence requiring restitution. Undoubtedly,
such a sentence, if authorized by statute, would be constitutional. Yet the determination of the
restitution award would have far less procedural formality than would the civil trial with respect to damages following the discretionary application of collateral estoppel. Hence, given
that there are two routes to the same end, it seems short-sighted to object to the potential for
unfairness in the more deliberate and procedurally guarded of the two.
153. See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PIIT. L. REY. 21 (1957) (surveying
law of France, Germany, Japan, The Philippines, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, and finding little precedent for corporate criminal liability outside of Anglo-American law).
154. See J)evelopments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, supra note 115, at 1247-51. See also New York Cent. &
H.R.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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different and more complex approach: depending on the type of
statute involved, the corporation is either (1) strictly liable, (2) liable
only if it was negligent in the supervision of its employees, or (3)
liable only if a "high managerial official" was involved. 155 Canadian
courts appear to have reached a similar result as a matter of judicial
construction. 156 Commentators have suggested further alternatives.
The editors of the Harvard Law Review have recently criticized the
Model Penal Code, claiming that its approach encourages evasion
and makes ignorance bliss since in many cases the corporation has a
valid defense if its senior officials were unaware of the conduct. 157
To replace the Code's formula, they suggest still another variant: the
corporation should be presumptively liable in all cases for the acts of
its employees at any level, unless it can establish the affirmative defense of due diligence. 158 They agree with the drafters of the Model
Penal Code that such a defense provides a desirable incentive for the
corporation to monitor its agents more closely.
Although there is merit in the Harvard proposal, its line of reasoning is not pursued far enough. If we grant that the purpose of the
affirmative due diligence defense is simply to encourage closer monitoring and that it is not based on any notion of fairness or retributive
justice, then there is a simpler means to this same end which does not
increase the prosecutor's burden in securing a conviction. Put simply, due diligence should be not an affirmative defense, but rather a
sentencing consideration. The legislature might indicate either
through sentencing guidelines or express legislative standards that
the penalty should be reduced where the corporate defendant can
155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1962). For an analysis, see .Developments in the Law,
supra note ll5, at 1251-53.
156. See Regina v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 85 D.L.R. 3d 161 (1978). Regina recognized a
"half-way house" between mens rea and absolute (or "strict") liability. The case held that the
defendant may seek to escape liability by establishing a defense that reasonable precautions
had been taken.
157. .Developments in the Law, supra note 115, at 1253-57. Under Model Penal Code Section 2.07(l)(c), the prosecutor must prove that either a "high managerial agent" or the board of
directors performed, authorized, or recklessly tolerated the offense. This doubles the prosecutor's burden because in addition to proving that the crime occurred, the prosecutor must also
impute intent to high managerial levels within the corporation; this in tum may create an
incentive for high officials to insulate themselves from such information.
158. .Developments in the Law, supra note 115, at 1257-58. In part, the Harvard rationale
rests on the premise that criminal sanctions should only be applied where there is the requisite
moral blameworthiness. But in the case of the organizational offender, the conviction is not
itself the sanction; not until a penalty is applied does the organization typically experience a
sanction. Thus, the due diligence defense can be delayed to the sentencing stage in the case of
organizations without offending the civil libertarian precept that criminal sanctions should
only be used to punish behavior involving moral culpability.
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demonstrate at sentencing that it has taken measures reasonable
under the circumstances to supervise and discipline employees.
What difference does it make whether the due diligence issue is
heard at trial or at sentencing? At first glance, it might appear that
the :financial incentive to the corporation is the same either way. But
this overlooks both the full significance of a criminal conviction and
the wider angle of vision that the sentencing stage gives the court.
First, delaying the due diligence issue to sentencing permits a conviction which can have collateral estoppel effect in civil litigation
brought by victims injured by the crime. In this light, public enforcement establishes the central issues on which private litigants can
piggyback. 159 Thus, the downgrading of the due diligence issues
from an affirmative defense to a sentencing consideration serves the
interests of both general deterrence and victim compensation.
Second, although at trial the fact finder can consider only
whether the defendant was adequately diligent in monitoring employees at the time of the alleged criminal behavior, 160 a much wider
range of information becomes relevant at sentencing. At sentencing,
the court can inquire into developments since the time of the crime
and even since the time of the trial: Have new measures been taken
to prevent repetition? Have responsible or negligent employees been
disciplined or fired? Such a wider angle of vision creates a stronger
incentive for the corporation to reform itself. Indeed, by using some
well-established circumlocutions, the court could indicate steps it
wishes to see taken, and suggest that it would reduce the :financial
penalties initially imposed if such measures were taken. Interestingly, S. 1722, the current Senate bill to recodify the Federal Criminal Code, mandates exactly this focus on internal corrective
measures and intra-corporate discipline as sentencing considerations.161
159. One advantage of such an integration is that the criminal process tends to reach a
litigated determination much more quickly than the civil process, thus ensuring speedier recoveries for victims and fairer negotiations (since the defendant may not as easily exploit its
ability to delay civil litigation when the criminal issues have already been determined adversely to it in an action brought by a public enforcer). In addition, public agencies appear
willing to attempt to prove more novel, higher risk theories than private plaintiff's attorneys
will attempt, given that the latter are motivated primarily by the expectation of contingent fees.
See Reich, supra note 136, at 1065.
160. Negligent behavior occuring subsequent to the time of the criminal incident would
generally be excluded from evidence as irrelevant and more prejudicial to the defendant than
probative. But exactly this information should be considered at sentencing, because we are
interested in the need at sentencing for deterrence.
161. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at § 220l(a)(4) (instructing court in imposing fine
against a corporation or other organization to consider "any measure taken by the organization to discipline its employees or agents responsible for the offense or to insure against a
recurrence of such an offense"). This position is also approved in the Committee Report to the
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These considerations also provide a partial answer to a more basic question: Why should we use the criminal law against the corporation when a system of civil penalties would encounter fewer
constitutional obstacles? This question has particular merit in light
of the Supreme Court's decision last term in United States v.
Ward, 162 upholding the constitutionality of a civil penalty which almost exactly paralleled a long-established criminal statute. Ward
opens up a broad horizon of civil-law penalties which could be more
simply enforced than penal statutes requiring a criminal trial. The
classic reason offered for using the criminal law when financially
equivalent civil remedies are available has been that the criminal
law uniquely can focus public censure upon the guilty defendant. 163
This stigmatization argument clearly has some merit, but it does not
stand alone. Two other pragmatic arguments for applying the criminal law - one procedural and one institutional - deserve consideration: first, because criminal cases are typically concluded in a much
shorter time span than civil cases, the criminal law potentially can
serve as an engine by which to expedite restitution to victims. This
could occur either by authorizing the sentencing court to impose restitution as a sentence or by clarifying the collateral estoppel impact
of a criminal conviction. Either way, the relative celerity with which
criminal cases are resolved would benefit the victim, who otherwise
might be forced by economic exigencies to make a hasty settlement
when he cannot afford to wait out the civil docket's interminable
delays. 164
Second, useful as a civil penalties system might be, particularly
as a means for transferring the bulk of petty regulatory offenses now
in most penal codes to an administrative forum, public enforcers
cannot be transferred from a criminal to a civil context as easily as
statutes. A great infrastructure of criminal law enforcers exists today
in state and federal offices across the country. In sheer magnitude,
the number of criminal prosecutors probably dwarfs the number of
attorneys available to administrative agencies to enforce civil-law
penalties. They cannot be transferred because, even apart from the
companion House Bill, H.R. 6915. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 467
(1980).
162. 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
163. Compare Note, supra note 9, at 287 n.35 with Kramer, Criminal Prosecutionsfor Violations ofthe Sherman Act: In Search ofa Policy, 48 GEO. L.J. 530, 531-35 (1960); cf. E. SUTH•
ERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 43 (1949) (discussing the policy of removing the stigma of
crime from penalties for antitrust violations).
164. This theme is discussed at greater length in the commentary to 3 ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 91, at 18-2.8, 170-73.
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usual arguments about institutional rivalry and bureaucratic turfguarding, their core mission is the enforcement of the criminal law
against individuals. As a result, by abandoning the notion of corporate criminal responsibility, we risk underutilizing this decentralized
infrastructure of public enforcers. Moreover, there are important
economies of scale and tactical advantages in prosecuting the corporation and its officers in a single criminal suit. 165
These arguments are, of course, of a political, pragmatic anc! institutional nature. But no apology need be made for such a focus.
The study of corporate criminal responsibility too long has been led
astray by commentators seeking to fashion retributive justifications
and anthropomorphic analogies. Such an approach not only compounds the legal fiction of corporate personality with the legal fiction
of corporate mens rea, but worse yet, it blinds us to the real issue of
how to make deterrence work when the offender is an organization.
IV.

BEYOND DETERRENCE: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
PREVENTIVE RESTRAINTS

Deterrence is an indirect organizational strategy: we raise the
costs of an activity in anticipation that the organization will restrain
its agents. Frequently, the civil law has relied on a more direct strategy, the injunction, which can be framed to require, rather than simply encourage, internal reform. 166 Only recently have criminal-law
scholars begun seriously to consider that the criminal law could also
intervene directly by interjecting the court or its agents into the corporation's decision-making processes in an attempt to remedy dysfunctions that seem causally related to the criminal behavior. 167 The
most promising vehicle for such an attempt is the sentence of probation.168 Traditionally, probation was seen as an elective disposition
165. See note 6 supra. Experienced defense counsel have informed me that the phrase
''Westinghouse settlement" has today become a term of art to refer to a plea bargain under
which the corporation pleads guilty, but charges are dropped against all individual defendants.
Such a settlement may be a symbolic and hollow victory for the government - unless restitution is thereby secured or the interests of victims and society otherwise advanced through
probation conditions or deterrent fines. But the tactical advantages that such a joint prosecution gives the government seem clear indeed.
166. For an interesting speculative discussion of the reach of such a remedy, see Note,
Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89
YALE L.J. 513 (1980).
167. Among the articles that have considered this question are Fisse, Responsibility, Prevention, and Corporate Crime, 5 NEW ZEALAND U. L. REV. 250 (1973); Note, supra note 8; Note
supra note 9.
168. For the federal probation statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976). For a general discussion of the principles applicable to probation conditions, see 3 ABA STANDARDS, supra note
9 I, at I8-2.3.
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which the offender had to request or at least accept. 169 Thus, because the corporation would typically prefer to pay the fine as a cost
of doing business rather than change the way it actually did business,
it might often refuse such a disposition. More recently, however,
probation has come to be seen as a disposition which, being as much
in society's interest as the offender's, is neither elective nor a temporary holding category, but rather a sentence in its own right. 17° Concomitant with this transition, both the current Senate and House bills
to recodify the Federal Criminal Code authorize a probationary disposition for convicted organizations, 171 and the Second Edition of
the American Bar Association"'.s' Min~mum Standardsfor Criminal Justice has endorsed the use of such a sentence in some circumstances.172 A few cases have also accepted the idea of corporate
probation under existing law. 11 3
The theory of corporate probation is, however, easier to state
than its implementation is to outline. Assuming that the interests of
individual managers are incongruent with those of the firm, that excessive pressures for immediate results are sometimes placed on middle level managers, and that financial penalties directed at the firm
may not change the cost/benefit calculus of the individual within the
firm, what can a sentencing court do about all this? Dissolution and
similar remedies are too extreme to be taken seriously, and seem pa169. For a discussion of probation as applied to corporations, see United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972). Some decisions have held that the defendant may
refuse probation. See In re Osslo, 51 Cal. 2d 371, 377, 334 P.2d l, 5 (1958). The majority of
decisions, however, have rejected this view and seen it as the court's choice, not the defendant's, as to the form of sentence. See Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937)
(Federal Probation Act "vests a discretion in the Court, not a choice in the convict"). This
makes obvious sense in the case of the individual (where the state must house and feed the
offender and thus has its own interests in avoiding the unnecessary use of incarceration), but it
is equally sound in the case of the corporation where a fine may be inherently inadequate for
the reasons discussed in Section I of this Article.
170. See MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT, § 3-301 (sentence of "community
supervision" authorized in lieu of probation); 3 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 91, at ch. 18-2.3.
171. See S. 1722, supra note 62, at§ 2001(c); H.R. 6915, supra note 62, at §§ 3301-3305.
While the Senate bill expressly refers to probation as a disposition for organizations, the House
bill prefers the term "conditional discharge." The House Committee Report, however, plainly
indicates that there is no difference in intent. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
467 (1980).
172. See 3 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 91, at ch. 18-2.8 (limiting its recommendation to
circumstances where the corporation has been repetitively delinquent or there exists a "clear
and present danger'' to the public health or safety). The author served as Reporter for this
chapter of the ABA standards.
173. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972); Apex Oil v.
United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); United States v. NuTriumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. J.C. Ehrlich, Co., 372 F. Supp.
768 (D. Md. 1974); Borough of Roselle v. Santone Constr. Co., 119 N.J. Super. 315,291 A.2d
385 (1972).
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tently absurd once we realize that most corporations sooner or later
will be convicted of a nontrivial crime. 174 Thus, the idea of a narrower, more surgical intervention in corporate decision-making
sounds attractive in the abstract, but it remains a vacuous concept
unless it can be fleshed out with specific examples.
Accordingly, the remainder of this Article will consider practical
approaches to imposing sensible probation conditions on a convicted
corporation. To be sure, other practical problems also surround the
concept of corporate probation: How is it to be enforced? How long
should it last? How is it to be integrated with other penalties, particularly with statutory ceilings on financial penalties? Important as
these questions are, corporate probation will not grow out of its current infancy until courts see tangible benefits to be gained from such
a disposition. The following examples are not intended to suggest
that preventive restraints are normally desirable or appropriate, but
only to illustrate the kinds of intervention that are possible.
A. .Dangers to L!fe, Health_ or Safety

The American Bar Association has recognized that a probationlike disposition may be appropriate where there exists a "clear and
present danger'' to the public health or safety. 175 Such cases are increasingly likely to appear before sentencing courts as legal regulation of toxic and environmental hazards, drug safety, and product
design comes to rely more extensively on the threat of criminal penalties. It is in this context that the concept of corporate probation
will have to cut its eye teeth. But what should be done? The SEC
has already pioneered. In its consent orders, the Commission has
required companies to design and implement new auditing and
monitoring controls. 176 Although most of these orders were negotiated in illegal payments cases, some have required similar measures
in the environmental field, and one such settlement - that with Al174. q: M. CLINARD, P. YEAGER, J. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIES, supra note
108, at 214 (concluding that two thirds oflarge corporations violated the law). Although this
study has been sharply attacked on a number of grounds, see Orland, supra note 3, at 506-09,
even its critics would concede that corporate criminality is a pervasive phenomenon. See Orland, supra, at 510. The more realistic estimate reached by the Fortune editors that eleven
percent of the public corporations have been involved in a significant criminal activity within
the past decade hardly permits one to discount corporate criminality as an isolated phenomenon (particularly when the Fortune study counts only those charges that result in a plea or an
adjudication). See Ross, supra note 3.
115. See note 172supra.

176. For an overview of the scope of SEC consent orders, see Farrand, Ancillary Remedies
in SEC Civil Eeforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779 (1976); Mathews, Recent Trends in
SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunction Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323 (1976).
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lied Chemical - supplies a paradigm for what corporate probation
could seek to accomplish. 177 Following Allied Chemical's disastrous
dumping of Kepone, a highly toxic chemical, into Chesapeake Bay,
the company entered into a loosely worded consent order with the
SEC requiring it to undertake an "independent investigation of material environmental risk areas" and to take "appropriate action"
based on what it discovered. 178 Based largely on findings of the investigation, Allied established a Toxic Risk Assessment Committee
composed of scientists, doctors, and lawyers, to review all internal
corporate information on the toxic hazards to consumers and employees from the company's activities. The committee has direct access to senior management and also reports significant findings to the
Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA has hailed the system
as an industry model. 179 More important than the specific steps
taken by Allied is the process by which they were designed. 180 A
prominent management consulting firm was hired to redesign internal communications systems within the firm. It found that the corporation's executives "could assess the safety standards of fewer that
20 percent of the company's activities." 181 To shore up what all concerned recognized to be a "gaping hole in management reporting
systems," 182 internal corporate communications were redesigned to
centralize the fl.ow of such information through a new senior executive position.
Transposed to the sentencing context, this same inquiry and
redesign process could be measurably improved. For unlike the negotiation of a consent order, where the rights of the parties are uncertain and the agency frequently is forced to accept compromises
because of weaknesses in its case, the court's authority would be
clear. The court could itself appoint a management-consulting firm
or a team of business school academics to determine if inadequate
internal reporting or information flow contributed to the crime.
Presented with a plan for improved internal reporting, the court
might require the creation of a senior executive position to monitor
177. For background on the A/lied case, see Coffee, supra note 38, at 1271-72.
178. SEC v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 77-0373 at 2 (D.D.C., filed March 4, 1977).
179. Hayes, Complying With E.P.A. Rules, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, § IV, at 1, col. 3.
180. In overview, three elements seem important here: (I) an independent critique, (2) a
redesign of corporate internal reporting and the creation of an executive position sufficiently
senior to be able to respond effectively to such information, and (3) the creation of a permanent evaluative body with adequate technical skills (which in the ideal case might be staffed by
outside professionals).
181. Hayes, supra note 179, at 4, col I. The study was conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc.
182. Id.
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environmental, toxic or other health and safety hazards. Similarly, a
body analogous to Allied's Toxic Risk Assessment Committee could
be established to evaluate risks. In contrast to the Allied committee,
its members could include independent professionals having no
other relationship with the corporation. The company's obligations
to report to relevant regulatory agencies could also be tightened, and
these agencies could be invited to comment on the proposed probation conditions.
Obviously, such a probationary disposition interferes with the
managerial autonomy of the delinquent corporation. Predictably,
corporations will resist the legislative authorization of such a sanction. This suggests, however, that there are deterrent as well as preventive benefits to be gained from such a plan. Ultimately, the
relatively modest loss of managerial autonomy involved in such a
temporary period of probation might prove as effective a deterrent as
the financial penalties today imposed on corporations.
B. The "Wraparound Sentence"

The skeptic's obvious reply to the suggestion that the sentencing
process should emulate the successes of the SEC consent decrees is
that such emulation is unnecessarily duplicative. Why, if such sanctions work, should they not be left to regulatory agencies rather than
incorporated into the criminal law? This is a sensible question which
merits a tripartite reply: first, the jurisdiction of most regulatory
agencies is hardly co-extensive with the full range of possible corporate criminal misbehavior. Even the SEC's elastic concept of "materiality" can be stretched only so far, and not every crime is
necessarily material to investors even if it is seriously injurious to
some segment of the public. 183 Second, agencies can be lobbied, and
their willingness to pursue corporate misbehavior waxes and wanes
both with the tide of political changes and with internal agency priorities that may require reallocations of manpower. 184 These
changes are inevitable and are not here lamented; but as a result, the
criminal justice system cannot rely on other agencies to accomplish
its principal goal of crime prevention. Third, the primary enforce183. See Coffee, supra note 38, at 1258-62 (discussing possible theories of materiality),
Currently, SEC regulations only require the disclosure of "material" pending legal proceedings in which the registrant is a party or its property the subject. See SEC Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.20, Item 5 (1980). Instruction 5 to this Item then defines certain environmental
litigation as per se material, but otherwise legal proceedings generally appear to be considered
material only if they involve a claim for damages which exceeds defined percentages of the
current assets of the registrant.
184. See note 65 supra.
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ment device of the SEC, the consent order, has a basic limitation: in
practice, it seldom leads to any significant sanction if it is violated. 185
Typically, the SEC does no more than obtain another consent order
or injunction; it rarely seeks a contempt penalty. Another problem
with the SEC consent orders is that they frequently consist of vague
language which parties can legitimately read differently. 186 This occurs in large part because the orders are negotiated as a form of plea
bargaining, and concessions are offered by the public enforcer in the
form of deliberate ambiguity.
Like the consent decree, corporate probation has its own limitations. For example, there is no natural probation officer to monitor
compliance with the conditions of probations, particularly if such
monitoring requires some technical expertise. 187 But a sentence of
185. The typical SEC consent order enjoins future violations of the securities laws and may
impose additional ancillary relief. See note 176 supra. This injuction (typically called a "Goand-sin-no-more" order) can, of course, lead to criminal contempt penalties if any of its terms
are violated. In principle, it is not even necessary to show that an individual knew that his acts
would violate the injunction. All that need be shown is that the acts were consciously and
deliberately performed and did violate the injunction. Once enjoined, the burden is on the
individual to be certain that he complies. See United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp.,
376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967). Nonetheless, as a matter of enforcement policy, the SEC rarely attempts to obtain contempt penalties. Instead, the agency typically obtains another (and probably tighter) consent order when it feels the first has been
violated. This practice may in part reflect the difficulty of proving that the conduct in question
was in fact a violation of either the securities laws or the terms of the frequently vaguely
worded consent order. For a discussion of other problems with civil injunctions, see Hazen,
Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation ofthe Securities and Exchange Commission's Use of
Injunctions and Other Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1979); Mathews, The SEC
and Civil Injunctions: It's Time to Give the Commission An Administrative Cease and .Desist
Remedy, 6 Sec. REG. L.J. 345 (1979).
One other major limitation on the civil injunction which the "wraparound sentence" may
also outflank should be noted: equitable relief is traditionally not permitted to impose penalties. Without statutory revision, it seems clear that the SEC cannot explicitly seek a civil injunction which imposes sanctions on a deterrence-based rationale. See Farrand, supra note
176, at 1808. Of course, other rationales may (and do) permit the SEC to obtain relief which is
in fact punitive, but, even with respect to these alternative theories, there are continuing doubts
as to whether civil injunctions may pursue even the purely compensatory objective of seeking
restitution for nonparty investors. Id. at 1800-05. I do not mean to criticize the Commission's
persistent attempts to secure compensation, but to suggest the desirability of corporate probation as a means of securing those forms of relief and restitution which are beyond the grasp of
the SEC. In addition, to the extent that remedial sanctions (such as disqualification from office) are found to be punitive and therefore beyond the SEC's reach in a litigated civil proceeding, they may be fully appropriate as probation conditions. q: Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp.
1221 (D.D.C. 1974) (upholding disqualification from office as condition of presidential commutation of sentence).
186. Consider again the Allied Chemical consent decree discussed in the text at note 178
supra. It required only that the corporation investigate environmental risks and take "appropriate" action. It is difficult to envision a court finding that such a vague requirement had
been violated where the corporation made even the slightest effort to comply.
187. Discussions with officials of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice lead
me to believe that corporate probation will not be much utilized as a sanction, or at least will
not become the vehicle for organizational remedies, until federal prosecutors are able to transfer to others the burden of monitoring compliance. This is in no respect intended as a criticism
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probation does have built-in sanctions: a-substantial fine can be suspended so as to hang over the corporation like the Sword of Damocles.188 If probation is revoked for proved noncompliance with a
condition of probation, then all or part of the suspended fine can be
levied. Moreover, although due process requires a hearing before
probation can be revoked, 189 there is no need to initiate a new prosecution or civil proceeding as there would be when contempt penalties are relied upon to enforce a consent order.
In short, the consent order and the sentence to probation have
reciprocal strengths and weaknesses: the former is not easily enforced, the latter lacks an available monitoring body. But, by combining the two, each can remedy the problem of the other. The court
could sentence the corporation to probation, and the administrative
agency could monitor compliance with the terms. The court could
also suspend a punitive fine (either in cash or an "equity fine") for
the period of probation to ensure compliance. How would such a
structure work? In many instances (such as the Allied Chemical case
discussed earlier), the same criminal behavior, once discovered, will
result in both a consent order (or an injunction in a litigated case)
and a criminal conviction. In these instances, the sentencing court
should ''wrap" its sentence around the consent decree by making
compliance with the consent decree a condition of probation. In effect, this tactic of incorporation by reference permits the agency to
prove a violation of the consent order in a less formal manner than a
civil contempt trial and to obtain a severe penalty as a result. Of
course, such. incorporation should be selective, not automatic, and
not all terms of the consent order need be picked up. In those cases
where there is no consent order, the court could still consult with
appropriate regulatory agencies to act as an amicus curiae in fashioning and monitoring probation conditions. For example, in an environmental case, the EPA could suggest reporting requirements in
of federal prosecutors, but is simply a judgment which reflects the heavy caseload pressures
they bear. Typically, the prosecutor defines his job as that of securing conviction. While he
may be willing to plea bargain over the issue of remedies, he is neither well positioned nor
adequately equipped to supervise compliance. In contrast, the SEC, which administers a continuous disclosure system for public corporations and has on-going contact with them, is better
positioned to monitor corporate compliance.
188. See United States v. J.C. Ehrlich Co., 372 F. Supp. 768 (D. Md. 1974). Alternatively,
the court can suspend both the imposition and execution of the sentence until probation is
violated. This is preferable since once a fine which is less than the statutory maximum is
imposed, and its execution is suspended, a higher fine may not be constitutionally imposed on
revocation. See United States v. Best, 571 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126, 128-29 (1st Cir. 1977) (double jeopardy violated by enhancing penalty
after its imposition).
189. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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addition to those imposed by law for a convicted corporation, and
observance of those requirements could be clearly defined as a condition of probation.
C. Activating Internal Discipline
The foregoing approaches focus on the firm rather than the individual. To reach the responsible manager, society must either prosecute him or motivate the firm to use its own disciplinary resources
(e.g., dismissal, demotion, loss of fringe benefits, etc.). The premise
of sanctions aimed at the firm is simply that, if we punish the firm
heavily enough, it will restrain its employees or agents. But, the danger in this logic is that only low-level scapegoats may be disciplined
by the firm, since passively responsible senior officials may be able to
disguise their own involvement. The logic of deterrence may produce a highly biased form of internal discipline which never penetrates to upper levels.
How can internal discipline be improved? Again, the best answer
seems to lie in the use of an internal investigation by a respected,
disinterested counsel whose selection is approved by the court. As a
condition of probation, the court could order such a study and require it to identify those whose negligence or indifference made possible the illegal conduct of the active participants. The real impact of
such a report lies in its public submission to shareholders. Empirical
evidence suggests that corporations can be embarrassed. 19 For example, if a report concludes that an official was seriously negligent in
failing to act on information that a corporate product was hazardous,
and the corporation sustained high financial penalties as a result, it
becomes difficult for the corporation to fail to take action in response. More importantly, the court can encourage a disciplinary
response by explicitly taking into account the extent of internal disciplinary measures in setting the fine or determining the length of probation.191 In a sense, the court by these measures is coercing ·the
corporation to discipline its agents. Unsettling as that may sound, it
is no di.fferent in principle from judicially approved practices that
courts have long employed to coerce individual defendants into cooperating with the prosecutor.1 92

°

190. See D. VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION (1978) (containing case histories of instances where corporations have responded to citizen or consumer pressure). See also Talking
It Over: More Concerns Willing lo Enter Negotiations on Holder Resolutions, Wall St. J., Mar.
23, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
191. See note 161 supra.
192. See note 120 supra.
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This strategy uniquely permits us to reach the negligent official
whom the prosecutor rarely indicts and the jury only reluctantly convicts. Moreover, it makes possible the use of less severe sanctions
than conviction or dismissal. Here as elsewhere, the possibility of
lesser penalties reduces the likelihood of nullification.
D. Realigning the Manager's Interests
Finally, a court might use probation conditions to realign the
manager's interests. The idea that the manager's interests are not
necessarily aligned with those of the firm has run through this Article, and is indeed a familiar theme in the literature on corporate
governance. But is this incongruence inevitable? The possibility of a
judicially initiated realignment of the manager's self-interest is worthy of consideration. First, a practical illustration is again supplied
by the Allied Chemical case: in the aftermath of its Kepone debacle,
Allied revised its compensation system so that approximately one
third of a plant manager's pay would be based on safety performance.193 Allied then experienced a dramatic seventy-five percent decline in its plant injury record between 1975 and 1979. 194
What Allied has done voluntarily a court might also mandate.
Admittedly, it would be difficult to monitor whether the incorporation of safety and similar criteria into the compensation structure
was real or only cosmetic. Nevertheless, there are alternative paths
to the same end which can be better monitored. For example, a
court could prohibit fringe benefits and limit salary raises to some
national or industry average rate of increase until prescribed safety,
environmental or similar nonprofit maximizing targets are
achieved. 195 Such a restriction need not be applied to the corporation as a whole, but could be limited to the division, plant, or headquarters unit involved in the criminal behavior. Clearly, some
employees would evade this restriction through transfers to other
firms or relocations within the same corporation, but others would
193. See Hayes, supra note 179, at 4, col. I.
194. Id.
195. Harvard Business School Professor Joseph Bower gives an interesting example of how
the incongruence between the corporation's aims and those of its managers must be resolved
before corporate behavior will change desirably. Suppose, he writes, a corporation at its highest levels does indeed give priority to clean air as a corporate goal. Nonetheless, he concludes
plant managers will not pursue that goal unless they are forgiven its impact on their plant's
profitability. See Bower, On the Amoral Organization, in THE CORPORATE SOCIETY 178, 197
(R. Marris ed. 1974). Corporate probation could seek to reduce this incongruence through
positive and negative incentives: required stock bonuses for those managers who do achieve
reductions in their toxic emissions, or penalties in the form of limits on fringe benefits until
such goals are achieved.
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not. Those left behind would have a strong incentive to meet the
defined targets - even if their corporation preferred to give onlypro
forma lip service to these same goals.
Attempts to tinker with the incentive structure within the firm are
admittedly dangerous, for they interfere in unpredictable ways with
the dictates of efficiency. Yet at the same time, such a preventive
restraint shifts our focus from the firm or the individual to the subunit within the :firm. Frequently, this is the true locus of misbehavior. Considerations such as group loyalty and special subunit goals
not infrequently lead a cohesive working group to persist in behavior
that is adverse to the overall interest of the firm. Decisions within
the subgroup are often so collective in nature that a single responsible decision-maker equitably cannot be isolated for punishment.
If the working group is often the critical and indivisible unit
which shapes behavior within the organization, 196 then an optimal
system of sanctions must seek to diffuse its penalties over that subunit. Restrictions on stock options, .fringe benefits and executive
"perks" might achieve their goal in the case of senior management,
but probably less so in the case of plant managers and other
subordinate officials who less frequently qualify for such benefits.
However, even in their case the inevitably intrusive impact of
outside monitoring, particularly when coupled with rigorous reporting requirements, may provide sufficient deterrence. The purpose of
these restraints is not to punish, but to realign the interests of the
subunit on the theory that punishment imposed on the corporation
may not produce effects that are felt at their level. Additionally,
such a strategy plays off the key factor of group solidarity since an
individual who would otherwise to willing to take the risk of illegal
action may refrain if he thereby jeopardizes his fellow members of
the subgroup.
Obviously, restrictions of the sort last discussed are likely to be
much more bitterly resisted by the business community than probation conditions which simply require closer monitoring of health and
environmental hazards. But ultimately, society must tum to other
strategies if traditional approaches fail, and the corporate probation
provides a vehicle for such an attempt.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD PUNISHMENT THAT
FITS THE CORPORATION

One last question should be addressed: Do all the reforms dis196. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
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cussed in this Article necessarily require legislative action? Or can
they be at least partially implemented by the judiciary alone? Perhaps surprisingly, courts may be able to achieve them in substantial
measure without legislative action. A publicity sanction could, for
example, be implemented by placing the corporation on probation.
The nolo contendere plea is already a discretionary decision given to
the court. 197 Although the equity fine is not within the inherent
power of the court, there is no necessary obstacle to the court accepting such a fine when offered by the defendant as the alternative to
a higher cash fine. This scenario is more realistic than it at first
sounds. Frequently a single criminal transaction will either violate
multiple criminal statutes or be divisible into numerous counts of the
same offense. As a result, a cumulative fine can be levied equal to
the maximum fine per count times the number of counts resulting in
conviction. Under the pending Senate bill to recodify the Federal
Criminal Code, the maximum fine would be $1 million per count. 198
Thus, very high fines are possible, particularly in environmental
cases where the illegal activity often takes place many times over an
extended period. 199 As a result, it ironically may be a defendant and
not a prosecutor who is the first to ask a sentencing court to consider
the possibility of an equity fine. But clearly, the court could prepare
the way for such a request by tentatively imposing a high cash fine
and then suggesting to defense counsel that it consider developing an
alternative formula that would offer equivalent deterrence. 200
197. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b). But see note 144 supra.
198. S. 1722, supra note 62, at§ 220l(b)(2) ($1,000,000 maximum for all felonies and for
those misdemeanors resulting in loss of human life). See also H.R. 6915, supra note 62, at
§ 3502.
199. Allied Chemical has, for example, already paid out over $15 million as a result of its
conviction for the dumping ofKepone into the James River. See Hayes, supra note 179, at I,
col. 3.
200. On several recent occasions, sentencing courts have induced (or accepted) charitable
contributions by convicted corporations as an alternative to a severe cash fine. For example,
Allied Chemical was first fined $13.2 million by Federal District Judge Robert Merhige for its
Kepone dumping violations, but then was permitted to reduce the fine in a corresponding
amount when Allied Chemical established a foundation (the Virginia Environmental Endowment) and contributed $8 million to it. The judge's motivation appears in part to have been a
desire to keep the funds in Virginia (again, an example of courts resisting high penalties unless
they seek some compensating benefit flowing from them other than simply increased deterrence). See Zim,Allied Chemical's $20 Million Ordeal with Kepone, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978,
at 82, 89. Allied's motivation is clearer since, while fines are not deductible for tax purposes,
charitable contributions (and public relations expenses) are. Thus, it has been estimated that
Allied Chemical received a $4 million tax break through this alternative. See Stone, A Slap 011
the Wrist for the Kepone Moh, 22 Bus. & Soc. REV. 4 (1977).
A similar procedure was employed by federal district Judge Zampano in sentencing Olin
Corporation for illegal arms sales to Southern Rhodesia. After the court first ordered a charitable contribution and then rescinded this order on the ground that community restitution was
an unauthorized disposition, Olin made a "voluntary" $510,000 charitable contribution which
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Corporate probation is an area where courts undoubtedly should
proceed cautiously, and this Article has intended more to scout the
perimeters of that remedy than to recommend it as a mandatory sentence. But in an economy characterized by imperfect competition,
organizational slack, and innumerable obstacles that interfere with
the expected impact of penalties for corporate misbehavior, direct
judicial intervention in certain areas of the firm's decision-making
processes will at times be necessary. It is a curious paradox that the
civil law is better equipped at present than the criminal law to authorize these interventions. Corporate probation could fill this gap
and, at last, offer a punishment that fits the corporation.
The strategies outlined in this Article - the equity fine, adverse
publicity, integration of civil and criminal remedies, plea bargaining
for restitution, and corporate probation - have a common denominator: like the judo wrestler they use existing forces within the legal
environment and the corporation's social system to increase corporate deterrence with a minimum of socially counter-productive results. Unless we follow such a course, the Lord Chancellor's
frustrated observation that the corporation has neither a soul to
damn nor body to kick may remain an epitaph for society's attempts
to control organizational misbehavior.

was announced at its sentencing. Judge in Arms Case Orders Olin To Pay $510,000 in Charity,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1978, § D (Business), at 1, col. 1. I am also indebted to Professors Leonard Orland and Brent Fisse for a full description of the Olin case.
The court's ability to order a charitable contribution or "community restitution" is doubtful and in any event is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. United States v. Clovis Retail
Liquor Dealers Trade Assn., 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1976) (probation conditioned upon payment of "community restitution" held improper, because the recipient charity or persons
which it helps were not aggrieved in that amount "by the offense for which conviction was
had"). But what is here relevant is both the apparent willingness of defendants to suggest less
costly alternatives to the cash fine and the interest of courts in finding ways to use the fine to
benefit the community in which the offense occurred. Given these mutual interests, the court
might similarly induce an offer of an equity fine from the defendant as an alternative to a
higher cash fine. Procedurally, the court could first impose the higher cash fine and then reduce it upon a motion by the defendant under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure accompanied by an offer to make a donation of equity securities to the state crime
victim compensation fund. Under the pending legislation to recodify the Federal Criminal
Code, all criminal fines paid to United States courts will be deposited in a Victim Compensation Fund. See S. 1722, § 4111. In addition, under§ 41 ll(d), this fund would be authorized to
receive "all contributions to such fund from public or private sources." Hence, although the
court might not compel such an equity fine, it could encourage its donation and then offset it
against the criminal cash fine it might otherwise have imposed. Even if such a contribution is
not tax deductible as a charitable contribution or as a public relations expense, the court could
give a greater than 100% offset against the fine in order to "encourage" such a donation.

